The Japanese Product Liability Law: Sending A Pro-Consumer Tsunami Through Japan\u27s Corporate and Judicial Worlds by Cohen, Jason F.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 21, Issue 1 1997 Article 6
The Japanese Product Liability Law: Sending
A Pro-Consumer Tsunami Through Japan’s
Corporate and Judicial Worlds
Jason F. Cohen∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Japanese Product Liability Law: Sending
A Pro-Consumer Tsunami Through Japan’s
Corporate and Judicial Worlds
Jason F. Cohen
Abstract
This note argues that Japan’s former product liability system deprived consumers of adequate
protection against product defects. This note also argues that Japan’s changing economic and po-
litical conditions necessitated the introduction of strict liability. Part I examines the development
of the Japanese legal system, traces the history of product liability in Japan, and discusses the
structural and cultural barriers to pursuing product liability claims. Part I also explains the prod-
uct liability legal theories in existence before the PL Law and discusses the twenty-year process
in which Japan debated the prospects of passing this legislation. Part I concludes by discussing
factors leading to the PL Law’s enactment. Part II discusses the PL Law’s provisions and exam-
ines the impact of the law on corporate Japan, the judiciary and government, and on Japanese
consumers. Part III argues that Japan needed the PL Law to bolster the position of Japanese con-
sumers against manufacturers and enable the Japanese government to facilitate deregulation by
reducing its product safety standards. Part III also argues that the PL Law is changing Japanese
society by promoting a pro-consumer attitude in Japan’s legal and corporate spheres. This Note
concludes that the PL Law is a key first step to creating a more equitable product liability recovery
system and making manufacturers more accountable to the Japanese public.
NOTES
THE JAPANESE PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW: SENDING A
PRO-CONSUMER TSUNAMI THROUGH JAPAN'S
CORPORATE AND JUDICIAL WORLDS
Jason F Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the Japanese economy grew faster than
that of any other advanced country.' By promoting manufactur-
ers' interests at the expense of consumers' interests, 2 Japanese
society moved from war-torn devastation3 to economic jugger-
naut status between 1945 and 1990.' In the early 1990s, how-
ever, Japan's Bubble Economy5 burst and economic growth
plummeted.6
Now, in the aftermath of the collapsed Bubble Economy, a
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1. EDWARD F. DENNISON & WILLIAM K. CHUNG, How JAPAN'S ECONOMY GREW So
FAST: THE SOURCES OF POSTWAR EXPANSION 46-54 (1976) (discussing how Japan was
able to obtain postwar growth rate far above that of any other advanced country).
2. ROBERT C. Hsu, THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 81 (1994)
(explaining that postwar Japanese economic policy favored manufacturers).
3. AStA'S NEW GIANT: HOW THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 9 (H. Patrick & H.
Rosovsky eds.) (1976) (discussing how World War Two claimed 2.8 million Japanese
deaths and destroyed forty percent ofJapan's capital stock); ROBERT C. ANGEL, EXPLAIN-
INC ECONOMIC POLICY FAILURE: JAPAN IN THE 1969-1971 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CRISIS
29-30 (1991) (describing Japan's society at end of World War II as being one in which
more than ten million people were left unemployed, food and clothing shortages were
rampant, imports of essential resources were blocked, inflation was uncontrollable, and
industrial production was at standstill).
4. See David Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, Japanese Product Safety Regula-
tion and International Trade, 19 U.B.C. L. REV. 314-16 (1985) (discussing Japan's emer-
gence as leading trading partner of United States and Canada); ANGEL, supra note 3, at
44 (discussing how Japan's double-digit postwar growth earned it reputation of "eco-
nomic miracle" among worldwide watchers).
5. Hsu, supra note 2, at 38. "Bubble Economy" is a term often used to refer to
Japan's speculative and inflated wealth in securities and land in 1986-89. Id. The bub-
ble burst in 1990 when the stock and property markets collapsed. Id.
6. CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE END OF JAPAN INC.: AND How THE NEW JAPAN WILL
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newJapan is emerging. 7 The Iron Triangle,8 an interlocking sys-
tem of business, bureaucracy, and politics that brought Japan to
its present level of prosperity is unraveling9 as the system fails to
meet the challenges of the global marketplace. t Many of Ja-
pan's leaders agree that the Japanese economy needs wide-
spread deregulation11 to transform the producer-focused sys-
tem 12 into one that is more market-driven 13 and consumer-ori-
LOOK 17-18 (1994) (explaining how collapse ofJapan's Bubble Economy is ending Ja-
pan's post-1945 model of export-driven, high-growth economic development).
7. Id. at 15-18. The fallout of the collapse of the Bubble Economy is not limited to
the worlds of economics and finance. Id. Instead, the collapse is affecting industrial,
political, diplomatic, technological, and social spheres. Id. at 16. The crisis resulting
from the end of the Bubble Economy is shattering the country's post-1945 consensus
and leading to the emergence of a new Japan. Id.
8. ELLIOTr J. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 113-31 (1984).
One commentator describes Japan's Iron Triangle system as follows:
The Japanese business system is a hybrid unique to Japan of free market and
government involvement. Its uniqueness is derived from the way in which the
government regulates the economy. In a democracy such as Japan's, eco-
nomic regulation by the government is usually based on laws authorizing the
government through its ministries to regulate the various sectors of the econ-
omy. In Japan, though, the governmental ministries often do not apply the
laws directly to regulate business but rather use a more informal process, one
sometimes based on no statutory authorization at all. The most famous exam-
ple of this process is 'administrative guidance' . . . Japan's actual system of
government ... is made up of the elected politicians, big business, and the
higher elements of the bureaucracy. These three groups not only work to-
gether in a consensus framework for what is commonly perceived as the good
ofJapan, but in addition each needs the help of the others... Ties between
the politicians and big business are strong, since so much of the funding for
election campaigns comes from the coffers of big business . . . The bureau-
cracy and big business also have close ties under the Japanese system ....
Id. at 113-15.
9. See Michael Hirsh & E. Keith Henry, The Unraveling ofJapan, Inc.: Multinationals
as Agents of Change, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 12 (explaining how Japan's
bureaucracy is losing its grip on Japan's business sector because companies are increas-
ingly moving operations abroad to avoid government control).
10. See id. at 11-12 (describing how Japan's multinational corporations believe Ja-
pan's market is overregulated and incapable of dealing with international competi-
tion).
11. SARKIS J. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS 54
(1990) (illustrating advantages of deregulation such as improved efficiency, shrinkage
of transaction costs, increased capital investment, and arguing new growth is best ac-
complished though deregulation).
12. Hsu, supra note 2, at 83-85. The author states that observers of Japan's econ-
omy often claim that:
[P]ostwar Japan has been producer oriented rather than consumer oriented,
and the Japanese government has promoted producers' interests at the ex-
pense of consumers' interests for the sake of pursuing rapid economic growth.
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ented. a4  The enactment of the Product Liability Law15 ("PL
Law"), which holds manufacturers liable for defective products
regardless of fault, is the result of an intensifying national effort
to deregulate government control in the face of consumer em-
powerment.' 6 In fact, many observers view the PL Law as Japan's
first major legal victory for its consumers. 17
Critics, however, argue that the PL Law fails to mark a water-
shed for the Japanese people.18 Some critics suggest that Japan
already had a working product liability system and that strict lia-
As evidence for this proposition, proponents have pointed to the importance
that the government has given to its industrial policy, the weak implementa-
tion of the Antimonopoly Law, the relative weakness of the consumer groups,
the lack of a product liability system, and the high prices of consumer goods
and food in Japan ....
Id.
13. Id. at 2 (discussing how Japan's media has recently been criticizing govern-
ment regulation for impeding market competition).
14. Keidanren's New Big Wheel, ToKyo Bus. TODAY, Sept. 1994, at 34 [hereinafter
New Big Wheel] (describing how Shoichiro Toyoda, Keidanren's chairman and chairman
of Toyota Motor Corp., made speech proclaiming that most important theme for Ja-
pan's economy is deregulation); Japanese Premier Says Deregulation Will Give Big, Quick
Boost to Economy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1997, at Al9 [hereinafter Deregulation Will Give Big,
Quick Boost] (explaining that Prime Minister Hashimoto believes deregulation will solve
Japan's long-term economic problems); Todd Crowell, Seeking Direction: Japan's Rescue
Plan May Actually Work - But Not For A While, ASIAWEEK, Jan. 31, 1997 (explaining how
leading politicians, economic analysts, and businesspeople have unanimously agreed
that Japan needs widespread deregulation to enable economy to be guided more by
free-market principles).
15. Seizobutsu Sekinin Ho [The Product Liability Law], Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan)
[hereinafter PL Law].
16. See Chiyono Sugiyama, Product Liability Puts Firms on the Defensive, DAILY YOMI-
URI, June 29, 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Firms on the Defensive] (stating "[the PL Law] is
considered a major turning point in government efforts to protect consumers" because
consumers no longer have to prove manufacturer's negligence to receive compensation
for product defects).
17. See Noriko Sato, Product Liability Law to Debut in Japan, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
June 28, 1995 (quoting "the PL Law is one step forward for consumers... [the law] can
already be credited for raising awareness among both consumers and manufacturers
about product safety."); Stephen H. Dunphy, Japan Is Experiencing a Retail Revolution,
SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at J1 (proclaiming PL Law marked Japan's "transforma-
tion from a producer-oriented economy to one that favors consumers.").
18. See, e.g. Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability
Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, But Access to Recovery is Limited By Formidable Barri-
ers, 16 U. PA.J. INr'L Bus. L. 669, 718 (1995) ("In considering the 'big picture,' the new
product liability law has limited impact in light of the culture of Japan."); Andrew Mar-
cuse, Why Japan's New Products Liability Law Isn't, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 365, 388
(1996) (arguing "the new [law] changes the Japanese products liability regime very
little."); Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, Weightier Than A Mountain: Duty, Hierarchy, and
the Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 67 (1996) (claiming "[t]he [PL
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bility is an unnecessary foreign import which will not take root in
Japanese society.19 Other critics, instead of focusing their argu-
ment on whether Japan needed the PL Law, conclude on the
basis of generalizations about Japan's culture and legal system
that the PL Law will not create a significant impact.20
This Note argues that Japan's former product liability sys-
tem deprived consumers of adequate protection against product
defects. Moreover, this Note contends that Japan's recently
changing economic and political conditions further reduced the
effectiveness of Japan's system and necessitated the introduction
of strict liability.
Part I examines the development of the Japanese legal sys-
tem, traces the history of product liability in Japan, and discusses
the structural and cultural barriers to pursuing product liability
claims. Part I also explains the product liability legal theories in
existence before the PL Law and discusses the twenty-year pro-
cess in which Japan debated the prospects of passing this legisla-
tion. Part I concludes by discussing factors leading to the PL
Law's enactment. Part II discusses the PL Law's provisions and
examines the impact of the law on corporate Japan, the judiciary
and government, and on Japanese consumers. Part III argues
thatJapan needed the PL Law to bolster the position ofJapanese
consumers against manufacturers and enable the Japanese gov-
Law] is not likely to disrupt Japanese society or the function of law in Japan, despite
optimistic expressions heard from American consumer advocates.").
19. See Lucille M. Ponte, The European Community and Japan Likely to Develop Similar
Cause-In-Fact Approaches to Defendant Identification?, 15 Lov L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 629,
667-71 (1993) (discussing that Japan's system of government regulation, public insur-
ance programs, and compensation trust funds obviated need for new product liability
law); Marcuse, supra note 18, at 365-66, 398 (concluding that PL Law merely codifies
the law that Japan's judges were already following); J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability
Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Experiment, 144 U. P A. L. REv. 1823, 1823-40
[hereinafter Products Liability Through Private Ordering] (discussing lack of need for
mandatory strict liability because some Japanese manufacturers voluntarily subjected
themselves to public insurance programs which utilized recovery mechanisms similar to
strict liability).
20. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 703-05, 718 (generalizing that structural
barriers to accessing Japan's judicial system prevent PL Law from having big impact on
entirety of Japan's system); Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 18, at 69 (arguing PL Law
is not likely to create any major changes because Japanese are not accustomed to con-
cept of consumer rights and are unable to find attorneys to represent their cases); Alex-
andra Williams, Japan's Recipe for Dispute Resolution, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGA-
TION, June 1996, at 2-3 (arguing that lack of cases brought under PL Law reinforces
notion that litigation will not increase because Japanese prefer social harmony and can
not bear cost and inconvenience of litigation).
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ernment to facilitate deregulation by reducing its product safety
standards. Part III also argues that the PL Law is changing Japa-
nese society by promoting a pro-consumer attitude in Japan's
legal and corporate spheres. This Note concludes that the PL
Law is a key first step to creating a more equitable product liabil-
ity recovery system and making manufacturers more accountable
to the Japanese public.
I. THE HISTORY OF JAPAN'S PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM
AND CULTURE
Japan's feudal legal history left behind a legacy of structural
and cultural barriers that, before the enactment of the PL Law,
often prevented injured consumers from pursuing product de-
fect claims.2 Japanese plaintiffs injured by defective products
faced difficult burdens of proof under pre-strict liability legal
theories.2 2 Political leaders, however, opposed the enactment of
a product liability law for more than twenty years.23 Ultimately,
in an effort to bolster Japanese consumers' ability to protect
themselves against product defects, 2 4 the government enacted
the PL Law, which went into effect on July 1, 1995.25
A. Historical Development of Japan's Legal System
Japan's first secular legal system emerged toward the end of
21. See Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, Product Liability Law in Japan: An
Introduction to a Developing Area of Law, 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 32 (1984) (ex-
plaining "[a] n understanding of product liability law and litigation in Japan must begin
with a discussion of the factors influencing Japanese attitudes toward law in general and
dispute settlement in particular and of the procedural and remedial limitations on pri-
vate litigation.").
22. See Marcuse, supra note 18, at 37347 (discussing that, before PL Law, Japanese
litigants faced difficulty meeting burdens of proof under contract and negligence theo-
ries because of plaintiffs' inability to gather evidence and prove manufacturers' fault);
Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 18, at 71 (stating 'Japanese contract and tort laws have
been impressively unhelpful to consumers, imposing doctrinal hurdles for plaintiffs in
addition to the cultural hurdles of an antilitigious, hierarchy-controlled society.").
23. Ponte, supra note 19, at 660 (1993) (discussing howJapanese government op-
posed PL Law because of its belief that proper balance already existed between Japa-
nese manufacturers and consumers).
24. See PL Law art. 1, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan) (stating purpose of PL Law is to
relieve people injured by product defects and contribute to improvement of people's
lives).
25. See PL Law supplementary provisions 1, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan) (stating
effective date as July 1, 1995).
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the seventh century when a centralized Emperor-dominated gov-
ernment gained control.2 6 The leaders adopted and revised the
legal codes of the Chinese T'ang Dynasty27 to create Ritsuryo,28
the first Japanese legal code. 29 Based on direct rule by the Em-
peror3" with heavy influence from Confucianism," this code re-
26. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 14-16 (1992). Before Japan began to adopt Chi-
nese legal concepts and institutions, Japan's system centered on communities that were
divided along lines of kinship ties and religious beliefs. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY
WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADox 29 (1991) [hereinafter AUTHORITY
WITHOUT POWER]. The leaders of the communities, chieftains, served as both priest
and king and governed largely through Shinto ritual and customary norms. Id. The
Emperor, who was a religious leader as well as ruler, managed the chieftains. ODA,
supra, at 15. The leaders did not employ a written legal system. Id. Religion and law
were inseparable and the system justified the punishment of crime as a way to purify
criminals after they had displeased the Shinto gods. Id. at 14. By the end of the fifth
century, the Yamato region's clan emerged as the dominant force in Japan and its
leader claimed both military and religious superiority. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER,
supra, at 29. Simultaneous with this political consolidation, Japan's interaction with
Korea and China increased. Id. Japan began to borrow a writing system, religion, and
other societal elements from the more advanced China. Id. By the middle of the sev-
enth century, Japan embarked on its first period of adopting foreign law, with its adap-
tation of the Chinese legal system. Id. By the end of the seventh century, a highly
centralized state had emerged under the direct rule of the Emperor. ODA, supra at 15.
27. ODA, supra note 26, at 15. The T'ang Dynasty's codes provided Japan with a
model for establishing its first body of administrative law. Id.
28. ODA, supra note 26, at 15. Japan enacted its first body of administrative law,
known as iyo, in 662 A.D. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 29. The Japa-
nese government later promulgated a series of penal statutes known as ritsu. Id. In
702, the government compiled the ritsu and the ryo and established ritsuryo, Japan's first
comprehensive code of administrative and penal law. Id.
29. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 29. In 718, the government
revised the first ritsuryo and created what is now known as the Yoro ritsuryo. Id. For
more than a thousand years, the Yoro ritsuiyo remained Japan's fundamental national
law. Id. Although the Japanese government directly copied the T'ang Code in its draft-
ing of the ritsuryo, Japan's actual system of governance departed from China's in many
ways. Id. at 30. For example, given that familial relations dominated the Japanese gov-
ernment before adoption of the Chinese system began, the Japanese could not imple-
ment the notion of China's merit-based bureaucracy. Id. The powerful families of Ja-
pan dominated the ranks ofJapan's centralized government. Id. Without the creation
of a strong centralized bureaucracy, Japan's ritsuryo failed to lessen the influence of
Japan's clan-based aristocracy on the Japanese legal system. Id.
30. ODA, supra note 26, at 16. Influenced by China's imperial system,Japan's clan-
dominated society gave way to the emergence of a Japanese Emperor. Id. Japan's Em-
peror did not, however, serve the same role as China's Emperor. AUTHORITY WITHOUT
POWER, supra note 26, at 30. The Japanese Emperor continued to have a religious,
shamanist role, as did the earlier clan chieftains, in performing rituals to assure purity
and fertility. Id.
31. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 671; YOSlYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO
JAPANESE LAW 22-26 (Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 9th ed. 1992).
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mained in effect until the beginning of the twelfth century 2
when samurai3 military rule conquered Japan.34 The period of
military rule, the Shogunate era,35 brought with it a hierarchical
society that placed emphasis on vertical relationships between
warlords and their warriors. 36 Unlike the system in medieval Eu-
rope, 37 the Japanese feudal system was unilateral in that the war-
riors provided their warlords with loyalty and subservience while
retaining no rights or authority against the warlords. 8 During
32. ODA, supra note 26, at 16. The ritsuryo codes remained the official law of the
land until the middle of the 1800s. Id. When the Emperor began to lose authority due
to the nobles' rise to power in the middle of the 10th century, however, the ritsuiyo were
still the official, but no longer the actual, national legal code. Id. From the beginning
of the 12th century, buke, the law of the feudal warriors, took precedence over the
ritsuyo. Id. By accumulating large estates that were exempt from taxes and outside the
authority of the centralized government, the warriors created a feudal system that re-
placed the centralized rule of the monarchy. Id.
33. Id. at 16-20. In order to protect their fiefdoms, the nobles hired warriors to
defend their estates. Id. The warriors also began to protect public order in the streets
of Kyoto, Japan's capital at that time. Id. Eventually, the warriors intermarried with
nobles and a new class of power, the samurai, emerged. Id.
34. Id. Different samurai clans, such as the Taira and Minamoto, battled each
other over time to gain control of Japan. Id.
35. Id. at 17. In 1192, Yoritomo Minamoto conquered all other clans and was ap-
pointed the first Shogun, highest general, by the Emperor. Id. Minamoto's govern-
ment, which consisted mostly of warriors, became known as a bakufu, a Shogunate. Id.
Minamoto's successors also became known as Shogun and the successor governments
became known as Shogunates. Id.
36. Id. Under the hierarchy of the Shogunate system, the Shogun was the supreme
leader and retainers, mostly warriors, swore loyalty to the Shogun and offered military
services. Id. In exchange for their loyalty, the Shogun provided the retainers with land
or the rights to proceeds from the land. Id.
37. See id. (arguing that under Medieval European feudal system, leaders were for-
mally required to compensate retainers and protect them). The European feudal lead-
ers granted their retainers legal rights. Id. The feudal bargain in Europe was viewed as
a mutually binding contract and the terms of conditional reciprocity had to be clearly
stated. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 37.
.38. ODA, supra note 26, at 17. The benefits that Japanese warriors received for
remaining loyal to their warlords, such as agricultural proceeds and land, were consid-
ered to be favors and not legal rights. Id. Thus, warlords were not legally required to
provide these benefits. Id. Because the Japanese feudal bargain was not viewed as a
legally binding contract, the Japanese relied on Confucian values to ensure the preser-
vation of their feudal agreements. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 37.
The Japanese warriors held feudal relations together through an intrinsic set of recipro-
cal duties, similar to those between parent and child, that extended to warlord and
warrior. Id. Whereas the feudal covenants in Europe laid the foundation for the social
contract and eventually the constitutional government, the Japanese characterization of
feudal covenants through a Confucian-kinship model, emphasizing benevolence and
loyalty, laid the foundation for the "familial characterization of the modern Japanese
state." Id. at 38.
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the Shogunate era, the legal system consisted mainly of unwrit-
ten customary laws. 3
9
Toward the end of the fifteenth century, Japan embarked
upon its third period of legal development when the Tokugawa
Shogunate,4 ° which followed a period of civil war,4 ' closed Japan
off from the rest of the world42 and reunited the country.4 3 In-
stead of enforcing a comprehensive legal code, the Tokugawa
39. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 671. During this period the expansion
of informal governance by warriors jeopardized the legitimacy of the formalized written
ritsuryo and imperial authority. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 47-49.
One of the reasons why Tokugawa rulers kept their law unpublished was to maintain
knowledge of the law as an elite preserve. Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 18, at 64.
40. AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 51-65. In 1600, Ieyasu Toku-
gawa founded the Tokugawa Shogunate which lasted through fifteen generations of
Shoguns until 1867. ODA, supra note 26, at 20. The Tokugawa Shogunate restored a
Japanese centralized government. Id. The system was unique, however, in that while
the Tokugawa family had direct control over one-fourth ofJapan, territorial lords who
were subordinate to the Shogun controlled the remaining part of the country. Id. "For
most Japanese today the institutions and processes of Tokugawa governance appear to
define their legal tradition." AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 51.
41. FRANK GIBNEY, THE PACIFIC CENTURY: AMERICA AND ASIA IN A CHANGING WORLD
67 (1992). When Tokugawa came to power in 1600, it ended more than a hundred and
fifty years of feudal civil wars in Japan. Id. Throughout that century and a half, the
Shoguns, who had taken actual authority away from the Emperor, had also lost their
legitimacy. Id. Daimyo, local barons, essentially ruled fifteenth century Japan with their
small competing armies of vassals and retainers. Id. Feudal alliances constantly shifted
during this period giving it the name of "the era of warring factions." Id.
42. Id. at 68-69. After Ieyasu Tokugawa defeated all factions and secured his hold
on Japan, he reinforced his authority by closingJapan off from the rest of the world and
prohibiting foreign trade. Id. at 69. The only trading post remained in Nagasaki and
was strictly monitored. Id. Any foreigner who attempted to enter Japan would be pun-
ished with the death penalty. Id.
43. Id. at 69. Tokugawa kept the country united by consolidating the daimyo and
awarding those who had supported his war efforts with the wealthiest fiefs. Id. He then
allowed the daimyo to remain as rulers of their territories, but kept them subservient to
his central government. Id. Tokugawa forced the samurai to live in the daimyo's castle
towns where they became soldier-bureaucrats. Id. No one could leave the town in
which he lived without permission from the Shogunate. Id. The Tokugawa govern-
ment brought peace to Japan through a totalitarian system. Id. As the later Meiji re-
former Fukuzawa Yukichi quoted:
The millions ofJapanese at that time were closed up inside millions of individ-
ual boxes. They were separated from one another by walls with little room to
move around ... The walls separating them were as strong as iron and could
not be broken by any amount of force. Having no motivation to employ their
talents in order to progress forward, people simply retreated into the safety of
their own shells. Over the course of several hundred years this routine be-
came second nature to them. Their spirit of initiative, as it is called, was lost
completely.
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Shogunate relied primarily on unwritten customary law." The
Tokugawa Shogunate promoted Confucian ideology by empha-
sizing strict obedience to hierarchy instead of recognizing indi-
vidual rights. 45
After more than two hundred and fifty years of self-imposed
isolation by the Japanese,46 Commodore Matthew Perry
47
opened Japan's doors to the world in 1853.48 Unable to handle
the challenges of an opened Japan,49 the Tokugawa government
collapsed and a new period of Japanese legal development com-
menced.5 ° Under the new legal order, the Meiji government5"
restored the Emperor as a political leader and implemented a
sweeping modernization program designed to restructure Ja-
pan's political and legal systems.52 Seeking to adopt a Western
44. ODA, supra note 26, at 21.
45. See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 671-72 (noting Tokugawa Shogunate
was heavily influenced by Confucianism and stressed obedience to superiors and har-
mony over individual rights). The concept of legal rights was so unusual in Japan
through the Tokugawa period that no Japanese word existed to express the idea until
the very end of the Tokugawa's rule. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 315, 326. Ieyasu
Tokugawa employed the ideology of the Zhu Xi school of neo-Confucianism to justify
his power. GIBNEY, supra note 41, at 70. Zhu Xi taught that "the same principle of
order bound both the natural world and human political society; hence a strong and
harmonious state, organized in a hierarchy of Confucian relationships, was in itself a
reflection of heaven's law, something not to be transgressed." Id.
46. ODA, supra note 26, at 21-22. The only foreign contacts Japan had during its
isolationist period were with the Dutch and the Chinese. Id. at 22. During this period,
Japan learned of the advancements of European civilization by way of the Dutch. Id.
47. Id. at 24 (discussing when Commodore Perry of the United States Navy arrived
in Japan, domestic political turmoil began leading to demise of Tokugawa Shogunate).
48. Id. When Perry came to Japan with eight ships, one-fourth of the power of the
U.S. Navy, Japan could not resist the threat. Id. Perry flaunted the technological prow-
ess of the United States by bringing along a complete miniature railway and showing off
the engines and guns of his ships. GIBNEY, supra note 41, at 74.
49. Id. As Katsu Kaishi, a supporter of the Shogun and one ofJapan's early mod-
ernizers wrote, "From the day of Perry's arrival, for more than ten years, our country
was in a state of indescribable confusion. The government was weak and irresolute,
without fixed policy or power of decision." GIBNEY, supra note 41, at 74-75.
50. ODA, supra note 26, at 24-25. After the Shogunate signed treaties to open Ja-
pan to the West, the daimyo began to support the Emperor in opposition to the Shogun.
Id. at 24. Keiki Tokugawa, the fifteenth Shogun, eventually had to resign in 1867 and
surrender his power to the Emperor. Id.
51. Id. The Meiji government replaced the Tokugawa government and ruled Ja-
pan until 1912. Id. at 24-32. The Meiji system replaced the feudal system with a new
system of prefectures controlled directly by the Emperor and his appointed prime min-
ister, ministers, and councilors. Id. at 24-25. Within the span of Emperor Meiji's reign,
'Japan transformed itself from a semi-feudal society into a modern nation-state," GIB-
NEY, supra note 41, at 85.
52. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 673. At the beginning of the Meiji
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system of law, the Meiji government imported a civil code system
and a Constitution modeled after the Prussian legal system.5"
The Meiji government's legal system remained intact until
Japan's defeat in World War II.5 After World War II, the Allies
assisted Japan with modifying its legal system.55 Japan redrafted
its Constitution and enacted other laws based on the U.S. legal
system. 56 Japan's post-World War II legal system, a hybrid of
Revolution, the government implemented three important changes. ODA, supra note
26, at 25. These changes included the creation of a modern tax system, the introduc-
tion of mandatory military service, and the abolition of class distinctions between samu-
rai, peasants, artisans, and merchants. Id. at 25. Japan also implemented a rapid indus-
trialization process under the slogan "Enrich the country and strengthen the army." Id.
at 31. As for adapting a new legal system, the Meiji government initially turned to
Chinese Law but then later looked to Europe for the drafting of new civil and criminal
codes. Id. at 26-27.
53. Id. at 26-32. The first Criminal Code, enacted in 1880, was based upon French
law but the period of French influence waned with the shift to Prussian Law in the
1880s. Id. at 27. The Prussian system influenced Japan's Code of Civil Procedure in
1890. Id. Prussia's system also influenced the terms of the Meiji Constitution, cabinet
system, and Imperial Diet. Id. The Meiji government chose Prussia's Constitution of
1850 as a model because Prussia's situation resembled Japan's in that it was a backwards
country that launched a process of modernization. Id. at 28-29. Furthermore, the Prus-
sian Constitution gave the Monarch great power over the parliament whereas the Japa-
nese regarded the French and British constitutions as too democratic. Id. at 29. Japa-
nese constitutional drafters firmly believed that the Emperor should be left as free from
control by the legislature as possible. Id. The Constitution was drafted to have no au-
thority over the imperial family. Id. The Constitution proclaimed that "loyalty to the
Emperor, Confucian obligation of filial piety, and obedience were the essence and vir-
tue of the nation." Id. at 30. See AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 75-80
(discussing process by which Meiji government drafted Civil Code and Constitution).
54. ODA, supra note 26, at 30. After World War II ended with the signing of the
Potsdam Declaration in 1945, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ("SCAP")
occupied Japan through indirect military rule. Id. at 32. The Japanese government
functioned only under SCAP's strict surveillance. Id. SCAP demilitarized and democra-
tized Japan and officially separated Shintoism from the state. Id.
55. Id. at 32-34. In 1945, the Allied Forces recommended five major reforms: "in-
troduction of equality of the sexes, encouragement of trade unions, liberalization and
democratization of education, liberalization from autocratic rule, and democratization
of the economy." Id at 32. These reform measures, signifying radical social, economic,
and political change, were embodied in the Constitution of 1947, which is still Japan's
Constitution. Id. at 33. This Constitution departs from the former one by declaring
that sovereignty rests with the people and not the Emperor, renouncing war as a right
of the nation, and incorporating an extensive bill of rights safeguarded by judicial re-
view. Id.
56. Id. Because SCAP's legal advisers were primarily American, U.S. law strongly
influenced the redrafting of the Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
three major labor laws, and the Anti-Monopoly Law. Id. at 33. SCAP did not signifi-
cantly amend the Criminal Code, Code of Civil Procedure, and the Commercial Code.
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Tokugawa tradition, European-influenced civil codes, and Amer-
ican-influenced laws, remains in place today.57
B. Factors Affecting Access to the Legal System
Various structural and cultural barriers, which restrict con-
sumer use of Japan's legal system, play a large role in limiting
the number of product liability suits to approximately 150 since
the end of World War 11.58 This low number is in contrast to the
more than 14,000 suits that U.S. litigants filed in federal courts
during the same time period.59 One group of scholars6" ("Cul-
tural Theorists") argues that the level of litigation is low because
Japanese culture is uniquely non-litigious.61 The Cultural Theo-
rists claim that changes to the Japanese legal structure, such as
enactment of the PL Law, do little to affect the Japanese litiga-
tion environment.62 Scholars on the other side of the debate63
57. Id.
58. Ponte, supra note 19, at 663 (1993).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, LAW IN
JAPAN, 41, 43-45 (1963) ("Traditionally, the Japanese people prefer extrajudicial, infor-
mal means of settling a controversy . . .resort to litigation has been condemned as
morally wrong, subversive, and rebellious."); NODA, supra note 31, at 159-60. The au-
thor states that:
To an honorable Japanese, the law is something that is undesirable, even de-
testable, something to keep as far away as possible. To never use the law or be
involved with the law, is the normal hope of honorable people. To take some-
one to court to guarantee the protection of one's own interests, or to be men-
tioned in court, even in a civil matter, is a shameful thing
Id.; Terry W. Schackmann, Reflections in a Rock Garden: A Civic Commitment to Interna-
tional Understanding?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 531, 546 (1994) ("The cultural environment in
Japan ... has not yet accepted litigation as a common, ready means of grievance resolu-
tion."); ODA, supra note 26, at 4-10 (describing that for years scholars have been ques-
tioning whether non-litigious nature of Japanese people keeps litigation low).
61. Schackmann, supra note 60, at 542-47 (arguing thatJapanese culture and tra-
dition, and not structure ofJapanese legal system, are reasons why law suits in Japan are
rare in comparison to other Western countries).
62. Id. at 547. (noting that it is superficial to blame structural barriers for low level
ofjudicial activity because culture creates its own structure and allows it to remain until
public consensus mandates change.) Id.
63. See, e.g. GLEN S. FUKUSHIMA, Background, in RICHARD H. WOHL ET AL., PRAC-
TICE BY FOREIGN LAWYERS IN JAPAN 8-9 (Richard H. Wohl & Stuart M. Chemtob eds.,
Richard S. Kanter trans., ABA Sec. of Int'l L. & Prac. 1989) (claiming lack of litigious-
ness in Japan results from structural problems within Japanese system and not from
cultural tendencies toward harmony and consensus); Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in
Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U.B.C. L. REv. 375, 387 (1985). The author
claims that
The days when Japanese lawyers could attribute the primary cause of our hav-
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("Structural Theorists") argue that structural, or institutional
barriers,64 limit access to the Japanese legal system and are re-
sponsible for the low level of litigation in Japan.65
1. Cultural Barriers
Cultural Theorists have long argued that a gap exists be-
tween the structure of Japanese law, which resembles Western
law, and the culture of Japan, which developed independently of
Western culture for thousands of years.66 These scholars focus
on Japan's Confucian-based legal history, which stressed inequal-
ity of individuals within a hierarchical society, and claim that as a
result of that history, Japanese citizens never developed an in-
nate desire to protect their individual rights.67 Japanese scholars
use the phrase ho-ishiki,6  legal consciousness, to describe the
unique anti-litigious nature of the Japanese.69
ing a smaller number of lawsuits to the people's lack of 'law consciousness' are
over. Although the Japanese people's attitude toward law is not the same as
that in the West, it is certain that a larger number of people are demanding
justice according to law rather than abandoning their claims solely for the
purpose of maintaining harmony in the community.
Id.
64. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 705-16. Commonly cited examples of
structural barriers to litigation in Japan are a shortage of attorneys, inefficientjudiciary,
high costs associated with litigation, limited damages, and expansive alternative dispute
resolution system. Id.
65. Tanaka, supra note 63, at 387.
66. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 35 (explaining "a dichotomy exists be-
tween the concepts of the formal legal system, as expressed in the codes and statutes,
and the actual application of that law to specific situations."); ODA, supra note 26, at 8-
10 (explaining that because of traditional Japanese values and morals, legal systems
Japan imported throughout its history did not successfully take root in Japanese soci-
ety); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 272-78 (1989) (discussing that
even though Japan adopted legal systems from many other countries, Japanese notion
of law remains largely same as in feudal times).
67. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 274-76 (claiming thatJapan's history did not instill
belief in ordinary Japanese citizens that law exists to protect them). Neither the Meiji
Constitution nor Western-inspired laws ever instilled a spirit within the Japanese to feel
protected against arbitrary abuses of the authority. Id. at 274. The absence of a sense
of rights in Japan is illustrated by the fact that the Japanese word for rights, kenri, still
conjures up an image of egotism for the average Japanese. Id. at 277. "On the whole
Japanese still think of law as an instrument of constraint used by the government to
impose its will." Id. at 276.
68. Tanaka, supra note 63, at 379-80 (explaining that Professor Kawashima first
used term "legal consciousness" to describe his socio-cultural explanation for Japanese





Cultural Theorists argue that instead of pursuing litigation
to settle disputes, the Japanese preferred to harmonize their in-
dividual needs with the interests of the community. v These
scholars explain that, out of respect for authority, consensus,
and social order, Japanese tend to shun using the legal system as
a vehicle for resolving disputes.71 Cultural Theorists claim that
conciliation is the preferred method among Japanese for resolv-
ing conflicts.7 2 These scholars contend that a modification of
Japan's legal structure would not change the Japanese cultural
tendency to disfavor litigation.73
2. Structural Barriers
Structural Theorists argue it is shortsighted to conclude that
Japanese culture is responsible for perpetuating a non-litigious
society.74 These scholars contend that Japanese claimants often
70. ElliottJ. Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
517, 519 (1983) [hereinafter Overview ofJapanese Legal System]. See Ottley & Ottley, supra
note 21, at 34 (discussing focus on group rather than on individual rights is exemplified
today by way in which Japanese employees dedicate themselves to their companies).
71. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 704-05. An example of Japanese citi-
zens' disdain for use of the legal system involves an incident in which a couple left their
young son in the care of their neighbors and the child drowned in a nearby pond. Id.
The couple sued the neighbors and received a judgment of Yen 5 million. Id. After
Japanese television and radio reported the verdict, a flood of letters and telephone calls
from outraged citizens besieged the couple. Id. The outraged citizens felt it was un-
characteristic ofJapanese not to settle the dispute among the parties. Id. As a result of
societal pressure, the couple dropped the suit and all claims for damages. Id.
72. Overview of Japanese Legal System, supra note 70, at 519; U.S. Business Litigation
Roundtable: Japanese Lauyers Stress Commonalities in Law Practice, [hereinafter Litigation
Roundtable] U.S. BuSINESs LITIGATION 24, 26 (February 1997). ("A lawsuit is probably
the last and hated resort, only after all other means of dispute resolution have been
exhausted."). Japanese dislike litigation because the parties involved do not reach their
own harmonious solutions. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 36. In litigation, because
judges decide which party is right and which party is wrong, the losing party loses face
in Japanese society. Id. Conversely, conciliation "emphasizes then participation of the
parties and attempts to reach a consensus based on mutual agreement. There is, then,
no clear winner or loser." Id.
73. Schackmann, supra note 60, at 546. The author argues that:
The role of law in a society and the people's readiness to resort to courts to
assert their rights remain a function of a society's history and culture. In Ja-
pan, that history is decidedly non-Western , and nothing suggests that a struc-
tural change in the legal system - whether the addition of lawyers, the reduc-
tion of trial time or the prohibition of judicial influence in settlement deci-
sions - will significantly increase, in the near term, the willingness of
Japanese to bring their grievances to court.
Id.
74. ODA, supra note 26, at (arguing that many observers of Japan believe it is un-
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decide against using litigation as a means of protecting their in-
dividual rights because structural barriers make it disadvanta-
geous for average claimants to litigate.75 Structural Theorists,
moreover, believe that the ideological gap between Japan's pres-
ent-day social practice and its imported democratic legal system
is not as wide as believed by the Cultural Theorists.7 6
By emphasizing that throughout history the Japanese peo-
ple never demanded the creation of an extensive alternative dis-
pute resolution system, Structural Theorists reject the notion
that the Japanese are inclined to favor conciliation over litiga-
tion.77 Instead, these scholars explain that the Japanese govern-
ment, which has long been diverting court cases to conciliation,
often gave Japanese claimants no choice but conciliation to re-
solve their disputes. 78 The Structural Theorists point out that
the Tokugawa government often forced disputants to reach their
true thatJapanese are reluctant to litigate); Tanaka, supra note 63, at 382, 387 (arguing
that shortsighted flaw of cultural theory is its premise thatJapanese race is immutable).
"Japanese attitudes toward law are a product of various political, economic and social
conditions... As the social environment changes and people's attitudes change, we can
safely say that no generation of thought entirely determines that of the next." Id.
75. FUKUSHIMA, supra note 63, at 8-9 ("The lack of litigiousness in Japan resulted
• . .from 'structural' problems within the Japanese system that barred the success of
Western practices."); John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant and the Role of
the Judiciary in Japan, 4JouRNAL OFJAPANESE STUDIEs 350, 359 (1978) [hereinafter Myth
of the Litigant] (arguing Japanese sue less often than their counterparts in United States
because, due to the cost and uncertainty of litigation, it is less profitable to sue in Ja-
pan). Professor Haley explains that the concept of non-litigiousness would only be
valid if evidence existed that Japanese litigants were averse to litigation even in situa-
tions where litigating would be more profitable. Id. A recent public survey supports
Professor Haley's argument. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 609 (1985)
[hereinafter Costs of the Consensual Myth] (citing Ho, Saiban, Bengoshi [Law, Litigation,
Lawyers] 76-90 (Osaka Bengoshi Kai ed. 1977). The survey, which asked what factors
would mostly deter respondents from litigating, found that 64% of the respondents
cited high litigation expenses, 54% cited court delays, and only 6.1% cited damage to
one's reputation from suing. Id.
76. ODA, supra note 26, at 9 ("An overemphasis on the disparity between law and
practice is often misleading and results in the mystification of Japanese Law."). The
reception of foreign law occurred easier in Japan than in countries under colonial rule
because the Japanese embraced foreign law without substantial resistance. Id. The Jap-
anese government, moreover, always modified the foreign laws it adopted to take into
account the existing customs and conventions in Japan. Id. at 9. As a result, there was
less friction between the new laws and established social practice. Id.
77. ODA, supra note 26, at 87.
78. Id..
122 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:108
own compromises79 and that the government of the 1920s and
1930s enacted many conciliation statutes to require Japanese liti-
gants to utilize conciliation procedures."0 Structural Theorists
claim, therefore, that the Japanese system,81 and not the Japa-
nese people, instituted conciliation as the preferred method of
dispute resolution for Japanese society. 2
Structural Theorists also argue that while Japanese tend to
be concerned about harmony within groups, their relationships
with members of different groups are not based on harmony."
There is, therefore, no cultural explanation, these scholars con-
tend, why Japanese would have any hesitation litigating against
someone outside of their neighborhood, company, or social cir-
cle. 4 Structural Theorists maintain that the real explanation for
Japan's dearth of litigation is the presence of institutional barri-
ers such as a shortage of Japanese attorneys, inefficient judicial
system, and lack of adequate discovery procedures.8 5
a. Shortage of Japanese Attorneys
Japanese citizens have difficulty gaining access to attor-
neys.8 6 Due to a rigorously controlled licensing process that
79. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 34 (discussing that during Tokugawa era
plaintiffs' cases were only brought before magistrate when conciliation failed).
80. Authority Without Power, supra note 26, at 85-96 (describing various statutes Japa-
nese government enacted during 1920s and 1930s). By the end of the 1930s, judges
and special commissioners had the power to require parties to conciliate and almost all
civil disputes became subject to conciliation procedures. Id. at 96. In the 1920s and
1930s, when lawsuits were on the rise in Japan, there was concern among the governing
elite that "litigation was destructive to a hierarchical social order .... Id. Today, the
Domestic Proceedings Act of 1947 covers the conciliation of domestic affairs and the
Conciliation of Civil Affairs Act of 1951 covers all other disputes. Tanaka, supra note
63, at 385.
81. See WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 57 (using term 'Japanese system" instead of
"Japanese state" or 'Japanese society" to create image of overreaching Japanese politic
resilient to democratic forces.)
82. Id. at 280 ("There are good reasons to reject the culturalist explanation and,
instead, view current judicial practice as a political legacy from the days when the Japa-
nese were forced to settle by conciliation. The system prefers conciliation, and makes
sure that it remains the preferred alternative to litigation.").
83. Id. (describing that relationships among differentJapanese groups are not har-
monious).
84. Id.
85. Myth of the Litigant; supra note 75, at 359-90 (arguing Japanese litigants sue less
frequently because it is simply less profitable to do so in Japan and without institutional
barriers concept that Japanese are uniquely non-litigious would carry little weight).
86. ODA, supra note 26, at 102. Tokyo and Osaka have 17.9% of Japan's total pop-
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grants permits to approximately 600 new attorneys per year,17
there are currently only 15,000 practicing lawyers in Japan for a
population of roughly 120 million."8 The United States has
twenty-five times as many attorneys per capita. 9 Most attorneys
in Japan, moreover, represent large companies and manufactur-
ers, which makes it difficult for plaintiffs in product liability suits
ulation but have 61.9% of Japan's lawyers. Id. See Michael O'Brien, Products Liability in
Japan, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 1992, at 17 (explaining mostJapanese lawyers practice in
major cities and almost 50% of lawyers are in Tokyo). Japanese lawyers do not have to
compete aggressively for clients. Id. As a result, Japanese attorneys can be more selec-
tive in choosing clients. Hiroshi Sarumida, Comparative Institutional Analysis of Product
Safety Systems in the United States and Japan: Alternative Approaches to Create Incentives for
Product Safety, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79, 103 (1996). In product defect cases in Japan,
victims that are part of a group of plaintiffs usually have more resources to seek legal
services than do isolated plaintiffs. Id. at 103-04. Group plaintiffs' cases also usually
involve more publicity thus making it easier to find counsel. Id. Since single-injury
plaintiffs' cases are usually not successful, attorneys are not inclined to bring lawsuits on
behalf of these victims. Id. A recent survey shows that only 30 of 250 product defect
cases in which Japanese lawyers were consulted were eventually filed. Id. at 104. Ameri-
can attorneys, in comparison, reported to file half of the cases for which they were
consulted. Id. Moreover, whereas consultation fees in the United States are usually
free because of the intense competition for clients, Japanese clients must pay an aver-
age of US$50 for thirty minutes of consultation. Id. at 103. Another difficulty Japanese
citizens face in finding counsel for product defect cases is thatJapanese attorneys usu-
ally do not specialize in areas like personal injury and lawyer advertising is prohibited.
Id.
87. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 676-78. The Japanese Bar is now re-
forming its policies and within a few years the number of attorneys expected to be
admitted per year will reach approximately 1000. Interview with Yasuhei Taniguchi,
Professor of Law, Kyoto University, in New York, New York (Mar. 26, 1997).
88. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 676; see WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at
279-80 (claiming that by keeping number of lawyers and judges very small, role of law
in Japan is minimized). Because of the lack of attorneys, Japanese are not encouraged
to go to court. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 280. See AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra
note 26, at 117 (arguing that although Japan may have efficient extrajudicial system,
Japan's lack of lawyers still has negative impact when extrajudicial functions break
down).
89. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 676-78. But see TMAu HATroR & DAN
FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 2/43-2/45 (1985) (indicating when Ja-
pan's non-lawyer specialists are added to total number of attorneys disparity between
Japan's number of attorneys and other countries' is less striking). In Japan, there are
several kinds of licensed non-lawyer specialists, such as patent agents, tax agents, and
judicial scriveners, who may counsel clients on the law. Id. There are also nonlicensed
specialists, such as corporate in-house counsels, who advise on the law. ODA, supra note
26, at 106-07. Most Japanese companies have a department or section handling legal
matters. Id. Of the employees who staff these departments, sixty percent studied law as
their undergraduate major, according to a survey. Id. The survey also indicated that
only four percent of the companies had a licensed attorney working in their legal de-
partments. Id. In contrast, legal departments in the United States are almost com-
pletely staffed by attorneys. Id.
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to find representation.9" The lack of lawyers, however, is due
not to a lack of interest among Japanese to become attorneys, as
evidenced by the nearly 30,000 applicants who take the National
Examination91 each year,9 2 but rather to the government's deci-
sion to keep a tight reign on the expansion of the profession.93
The Japanese government justifies its restriction on the profes-
sion by pointing to the high cost of providing training for law-
yers.9 4 Critics suggest, however, that the government is perpetu-
ating an unofficial policy against litigation to maintain the spirit
of Japan's anti-litigious legal history.95
In addition to the difficulty plaintiffs face in finding counsel
who will represent their interests, potential clients are burdened
90. Interview with Mr. Shinichi Sugiyama, Attorney for Tokyo HIV Litigation Attor-
neys Group, in New York, New York (May 5, 1997) (discussing that before enactment of
PL Law many attorneys in Japan did not want to represent product liability plaintiffs
because lack of product liability law impeded efforts to make strong cases in front of
judges); See Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 18, at 69 (stating "The consumer's lawyer,
heir to the gunslinger of the American frontier is absent in Japan .... [even Japan's
progressive] lawyer's are not of the same breed as the solitary and colorful personal-
injury entrepreneur, who helped to build strict products liability in the United States.").
91. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 89, at 2/9-2/14; ODA, supra note 26, at 109-
10. To become a private attorney, public prosecutor, or judge in Japan, one must pass
the national legal examination. Id. Although approximately 36,000 Japanese students
graduate from undergraduate law departments each year, only a small number of them
pass the national exam and can practice law. Id. On average, applicants take the exam
more than six times before passing. Id.
92. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 677-78. A comparison of applicants who
took the Japanese exam and a bar exam in the United States in 1975 showed that the
number of Japanese, relative to the total population, was higher than the number of
Americans. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 281. The Japanese may even have a stronger
desire to become attorneys than Americans do. Id.
93. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 676-77. There is great pressure from the
Japanese Bar Association to maintain this relative monopoly on the number of lawyers.
Id.
94. Id. at 678. After applicants pass the National Examination, the Japanese gov-
ernment requires them to attend the Legal Research and Training Institute in Tokyo
before becoming certified attorneys. Id. at 677. The cost of the training is borne by the
national government. Id at 678. By the end of the two year training, the trainees must
choose to become either a judge, private attorney, or public prosecutor. See Bengoshi
Ho [Lawyer's Law] Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 5(3) (Japan). There is discussion now
about the possibility of reducing the two-year training period to a one year period
which would increase the number of new attorneys beginning practice each year.
Taniguchi Interview, supra note 87.
95. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 678; WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 280-
281; AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 110 ("Some suggest that the limits
on admission to the Uapanese Bar] reflect a ... premeditated concern by the Japanese
bureaucracy to reduce or at least contain litigation and judicial activity.").
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with the expense of retaining counsel.9 6 Prior to receiving a
court's judgment, Japanese clients must pay their attorneys a re-
tainer fee based on their anticipated recovery amount.97 If they
win their case, plaintiffs customarily also pay a post-judgment fee
based on the award.98 Potential litigants often find it difficult to
afford litigation and, therefore, avoid taking legal action to es-
cape the risk of paying for an unsuccessful suit.99 In contrast,
litigants in the United States can bring a suit with more ease by
paying a small retainer fee or by paying a contingent fee based
on actual recovery amount.'0 0
b. Inefficient Judicial System and Restrictive Damages Scheme
The inefficiency of the judicial system presents several struc-
tural barriers to plaintiffs pursuing product liability suits in Ja-
pan. 01 First, the slow pace of trial proceedings discourages
plaintiffs from litigating. 10 2 Japanese trials often continue for
years marked by periods of a month or more between hear-
ings. t °3 A practical and obvious explanation for the trial delays is
that a shortage of judges causes trial schedules to get backlog-
96. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 708-11.
97. Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & SamuelJ. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litiga-
tion in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAw 443, 447-49 (1991).
98. Id. The Japan Federation of Bar Associations establishes retainer and success
fee schedules. Id. The fee schedules are not mandatory and are used only as guide-
lines. Id. According to the schedules, attorneys may receive a minimum of four per-
cent and a maximum of thirty percent of the final recovery. Id.
99. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 97, at 449. Plaintiffs are discouraged from
seeking high damage awards because they have to pay a percentage of that amount
whether they win or lose their suit. Id. Legal aid in Japan for people who can not
afford to hire counsel is far from sufficient in comparison with the funds available for
needy litigants in the United States and Europe. ODA, supra note 26, at 82-83.
100. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 709-11. Contingent fees have been
accepted in the United States as a way for less wealthy plaintiffs to also be able to retain
counsel. Id. The U.S. system is criticized, however, for increasing the incentive for
litigation and seeking excessive damage awards. Id.
101. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 705-08.
102. Id.
103. ODA, supra note 26, at 79-82. Even the simplest cases may take two or three
years to resolve at the district court level and larger cases may take ten years if there are
appeals. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 281. For complex cases, it is not unusual for
proceedings to last twenty five years before ajudgment is reached. Id. Even though the
Japanese Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court is re-
luctant to acknowledge a violation of this right. ODA, supra note 26, at 81. The
Supreme Court has even held that a 25 year litigation process does not violate this
constitutional provision. Id.
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ged.1 °4 Some scholars offer a more critical explanation by claim-
ing that, in the face of a national propensity toward harmony
and compromise, Japanese judges intentionally plan the long
breaks between hearings to encourage parties to reach their own
resolutions. 10 5
Limited pre-trial discovery is another procedural limitation
affecting product liability cases.106 Unlike the U.S. legal sys-
tem,10 7 the Japanese system does not allow for the use of inter-
rogatories 118or depositions. 1 9 Japanese law also restricts the
104. ODA, supra note 26, at 80; Bernstein & Fanning, supra note 18, at 45.
Although the Japanese population has more than tripled since 1890, the number of
judges has not even doubled. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 281. Because Japanese
courts are so overloaded with cases, there is a demand for more judicial personnel. Id.
105. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 705. The purpose of scattering the
hearing dates of trials is to encourage the parties to reach their own compromise. Id.
This custom gives judges no incentive to handle trials efficiently. Id. In the United
States, trials proceed almost continuously after they are started. Id. InJapan, even after
court proceedings begin, judges pressure plaintiffs to switch to the conciliation proce-
dure. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 281-82. If plaintiffs reject the pressure to settle out-
of-court and insist on receiving a decision from the court, judges are known to make
clear to the litigants that because of their non-cooperation, the case will most likely be
decided against them. Id. at 282. 'Judges themselves tend to believe that to pursue a
case through the legal process reflects an inferior moral attitude." Id.
106. ODA, supra note 26, at 375. Traditionally, Japan's Civil Code allowed parties
to ask the court to examine evidence before the trial if that evidence would be difficult
or impossible to examine at trial. Id. In recent years, these rules on preservation of
evidence have been used for discovery purposes as well. Id.
107. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 706. Parties in the United States enjoy
the benefits of a very liberal discovery process and have many opportunities to investi-
gate opponents' cases before trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. U.S. discovery methods include
"depositions upon oral examination or written questions, written interrogatories, pro-
duction of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property for
inspection or other purposes, and physical and mental examinations." Behrens & Rad-
dock, supra note 18, at 706. As long as the information being sought is relevant to some
issue in the case, and is not privileged, the information is obtainable. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). See H. Michael O'Brien, Products Liability in Japan, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb.
1992, at 18 (illustrating that liberal discovery procedures in United States allow plain-
tiffs in product liability suits to obtain defendant manufacturer's sensitive documents,
thus making plaintiff's burden of proof easier to meet).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Interrogatories are written replies under oath to written
questions propounded by another party. Id.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 30-31. Depositions are used to discover information, to im-
peach testimony at trial, or to replace live testimony when a witness is unavailable to
testify at trial. Id.; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 706-07 (explaining that in
Japan, interrogatories and requests for admissions are unavailable as are depositions of
witnesses who will not allow themselves to be voluntarily interviewed before trial). For
witnesses who will be unable to testify at trial, the Civil Code allows a party to make a
motion to the court for the preservation of evidence. Minji Soshoho [Minsoho] (Code
of Civil Procedure) Law No. 29 of 1890, art. 257 (Japan). A motion for the preservation
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production of documents during pre-trial discovery. 1 ' When lit-
igants request documents, they must make a motion that in-
cludes a specific request for each document, a description of
each document's contents, and an identification of who pos-
sesses the documents.1 '
Limits on pre-trial discovery have negatively impacted con-
sumers' efforts to bring product liability claims against large
manufacturers. 1 2 Restrictive discovery prevents plaintiffs from
being able to force defendants to produce internal corporate re-
ports about a defective product. 1 3 In light of these problems,
observers hoped the PL Law would have included a special dis-
covery provision.14 Although a discovery provision was not ulti-
mately included in the PL Law, the Diet 1 5 recently approved a
revised draft of the discovery provision of the Japanese Civil Pro-
cedure Code.' 1
6
The absence of ajury system is another disincentive for con-
of evidence must include a description of the facts to be proved, the evidence to be
discovered, and the reasons for the preservation of evidence. Id. An example when
preservation of evidence would be allowed is in the case of a dying witness. Litigation
Roundtable, supra note 72, at 26.
110. Minsoho art. 257. Discovery is limited to the production of three categories:
(1) where the document has already been specifically mentioned in the litigation, (2)
where the party with the burden of proof has a legal right to the document, and (3)
where the document has been prepared for the benefit of the other party. Id. In all
other circumstances, a party to litigation does not have to turn over documents sought
by the opposing party. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 707-08.
111. Minsoho art. 312. See Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 97, at 446 (highlight-
ing that vagueness of three discovery categories has lead to many lawsuits).
112. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 708.
113. Id.
114. O'BRIEN, supra note 86, at 18; Interview with Mr. Masato Nakamura, Con-
sumer Rights Attorney, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter Nakamura Inter-
view]; Interview with Mr. Toshihide Shichi, Attorney at Anderson Mori (Tokyo), in To-
kyo, Japan (Aug. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Shichi Interview].
115. HArrOo & HENDERSON, supra note 89, at 1/19-1/20. The firstJapanese Diet,
or parliament, was the Imperial Diet, which began in 1890. Id. at 1/18. The Imperial
Diet consisted of two houses, the House of Peers and the lower house. Id. at 1/19. The
House of Peers included representatives of the royal family and others appointed by the
Emperor. Id. The lower house members were elected by popular male vote. Id. Ever
since 1947, under the new Constitution, all Diet members are elected by Japanese citi-
zens twenty years of age or older, regardless of sex. Id. The Japanese Diet now consists
of two houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. Id.
116. Toshihide Shichi, Why Product Liability Litigation is About to Increase, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, 1996, at 16 [hereinafter Product Liability Litigation In-
crease] (discussing how new discovery law may enhance plaintiffs' ability to access impor-
tant documents to establish their burdens of proof).
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sumers to bring product liability suits in Japan.117 Commenta-
tors note that Japanese judges have historically favored manufac-
turers and often blamed consumers for misusing products and
causing their own injuries."' In difficult cases, badly injured
plaintiffs who face difficult burdens of proof have been unable
to rely on the sympathy of juries, as do their counterparts in the
United States, and, thus, see little incentive in bringing suit.'19
In addition to paying high attorney fees, Japanese litigants
must pay court filing fees, which progressively increase with the
amount of damages claimed. ° If plaintiffs lose their claims, the
filing fees are not recoverable.1 2 ' This is another disincentive
for Japanese citizens to seek large recovery amounts. 122 More-
over, litigants are often prevented from pursuing large claim
amounts because the Japanese system provides for no punitive
damages, 121 limits non-economic damages such as pain and suf-
117. Nancy L. Young, Japan's New Products Liability Law: Increased Protection for Con-
sumers, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 893, 903 (1996). The lack of a jury system
discourages plaintiffs from filing suits because the likelihood of receiving an excessive
damage award is reduced. Id. Plaintiffs are more willing, therefore, to settle out of
court. Id. In comparison, the use ofjuries in the United States favors finding defend-
ant manufacturers liable and awarding plaintiffs with higher damages. Id. See O'Brien,
supra note 86, at 18 (arguing juries are perceived by many as "wild card" of U.S. civil
litigation).
118. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 113-14.
119. Id. A survey conducted by the RAND Corporation confirmed thatjuries often
have a pro-plaintiff attitude when defendants are corporations and plaintiffs suffer se-
vere injuries. Id. at 112. The survey showed when defendants are manufacturers, plain-
tiffs' chances of winning lawsuits increase with the severity of plaintiffs' injuries. Id.
The level of injury severity, however, did increase plaintiffs chance of winning against
defendant corporations. Id. There are many cases that illustrate the role ofjury sympa-
thy in the United States. See, e.g., Ayers v. Johnson &Johnson Baby Products Co., 818 P.2d
1337, 1342 (Wash. 1991) (holding where infant drank baby oil and suffered brain dam-
age, manufacturer was liable for failure to warn although the risk was extremely low);
Siegel v. Mazda Motor Corp., 835 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding where driver
suffered brain damage from car accident, manufacturer was liable although manufac-
turer rebutted every possibility that any manufacturer-related defect had caused acci-
dent).
120. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 97, at 453. As an example of court filing
fees, a suit which involves damages of US$500,000 requires a fee of approximately
US$4,500. Id.
121. Id., at 446.
122. Id. (discussing that because court filing fees are paid in proportion to claim
amounts, plaintiffs are discouraged from seeking high damage awards).
123. Minpo [Civil Code] art. 709, Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan) [hereinafter Minpo].
Japanese civil law functions only to compensate plaintiffs and not to punish defendants.
Id. But see LITIGATION ROUNDTABLE, supra note 72, at 27-28 (suggesting that since
Supreme Court has yet to render judgment on punitive damages Japanese companies
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fering,'24 and prohibits use of the collateral source rule.12 5
c. Japanese Alternative Dispute Resolution System
Dating back to feudal Japan,'26 the Japanese alternative dis-
pute resolution system'2 7 ("ADR") deters litigants from utilizing
the Japanese courts128 because ADR is less expensive and more
accessible than the judicial system. 129 Commentators argue that
Japanese ADR institutions usurp the judiciary's role of defining
and enforcing the rules of society.'30 In the specific context of
still have reason to fear possibility of having to pay punitive damages in future). "There
is one court case that upheld not punitive, but rather consolation damages in favor of a
company. Though punitive and consolation damages are different economically, con-
solation damages function in a similar way because you don't have to prove hard evi-
dence of sustained damage." Id.
124. Minpo art. 710, Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan). Non-pecuniary damages, isharyo,
are recoverable for pain and suffering but the amount of damages are minimal and set
by the court. Id. Non-pecuniary damages in Japan in the past have rarely exceeded
approximately US$200,000 (using an exchange rate of one U.S. dollar being equal to
100 Japanese yen.) Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 97, at 451. In accordance with
Minpo art. 723, courts may award a remedy to restore an aggrieved party's reputation
which includes:
an apology in open court; a letter of apology from the wrongdoer to the de-
famed; a letter of apology or letter of withdrawal to the person concerned;
broadcasting of the withdrawal and an apology on television; a notice of apol-
ogy or withdrawal of the statement in the place where it occurred; removal of
the cause of the defamation; publication of an apology and a withdrawal in
newspaper; and the right to refute.
Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 97, at 452.
125. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 714-16. The collateral source rule, as
used in the United States, allows claimants to recover damages in addition to any com-
pensation received from insurance, workmen compensation or government benefits.
Id. In Japan, court damages offset the amount of money claimants receive from social
insurance and workers' accident compensation. Id. This practice discourages inflated
damages claims. Id.
126. OnA, supra note 26, at 23. The Tokugawa Shogunate viewed civil disputes as
less important than criminal disputes and believed that civil disputes should be settled
without the authority if possible. Id. The Shogunate, therefore, encouraged local offi-
cials or elders to informally settle disputes by conciliation. Id.
127. Andrew M. Pardieck, Virtuous Ways and Beautiful Customs: The Role of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Japan, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 31, 37-55 (classifying Japan's
ADR system into processes of compromise, conciliation, and arbitration).
128. Ponte, supra note 19, at 666-67 (arguing Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") process is greatly available to claimants without costs and delays of judicial
system, thus encouraging plaintiffs to use ADR instead of courts to settle disputes);
Kawashima, supra note 60, at 43-45; Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 325-26; Ottley &
Ottley, supra note 21, at 35-38.
129. ODA, supra note 26, at 86; Ponte, supra note 19, at 666-67.
130. See Pardieck, supra note 127, at 44 (arguing that facilitators of conciliation
130 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:108
product liability, scholars view litigants' preference for ADR over
the judiciary as problematic for the development of an effective
product liability system because ADR institutions do not publish
their opinions and, therefore, claimants have less access to infor-
mation regarding product defects.13 ' When parties resolve their
disputes through ADR, moreover, judges have less of an oppor-
tunity to interpret product liability law and develop new legal
theories. 13 2 Supporters of ADR stress, however, that ADR works
well in Japan,'133 thus reducing the need for a stronger judicial
role in product liability.' 34
Japanese ADR consists both of conciliation and arbitration
processes.13 5 The most formal ADR process is chotei,136 the Japa-
nese conciliation process which takes place under the guidance
of the courts.1 37 In civil disputes, parties may decide to initiate
processes have freedom to disregard substantive law and rely on subjective standards).
In analyzing the impact of ADR on the role of the judiciary, Professor Haley notes that:
Where, for example, governmental bureaucracies or private groups become
the law's primary enforcers ... they, not the courts, define the rules being
enforced and control their efficacy. To be sure, the judiciary may continue to
play a role and determine the outer boundaries of the law, but it is a much
diminished and less efficacious one. The containment of the judiciary's role
thus restricts the law's domain and empowers other agencies, public and pri-
vate, of enforcement.
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER, supra note 26, at 119.
131. Ponte, supra note 19, at 666-67 ("[The] private, informal nature [of ADR]
prevents the collection of product defect information, vital to other injured consumers
considering litigation . . ").
132. Id. at 667 ("By limiting litigation and encouraging the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms, Japanese courts have few meaningful opportunities for
detailed legal analysis of causation or for more expansive interpretations of cause-in-fact
theories"); Tetsuya Obuschi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution in
Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects with Special Emphasis on In-Court Compromise, 20 LAw
IN JAPAN 74, 88-89 (1987); Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 56; Cohen & Martin, supra
note 4, at 327.
133. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 38 (arguing ADR comports with Japa-
nese culture because Japanese prefer informal legal structure in which parties reach
consensus based upon mutual agreement); But see Pardieck, supra note 127, at 40 (sug-
gesting that parties may be indirectly forced into compromise agreements because same
judge who monitors compromise discussion often decides case if compromise is not
reached and case goes to trial).
134. Id.
135. ODA, supra note 26, at 83-86.
136. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 36-37 (describing chotei as a quasijudicial
alternative to formal litigation which involves a hearing conducted by a specifically des-
ignated committee).
137. Young, supra note 117, at 913-14; ODA, supra note 26, at 83. Court-level con-
ciliation is regulated mainly by the Law on Civil Conciliation and Family Affairs Adjudi-
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chotei instead of filing a suit. 3 ' A conciliation committee, com-
posed of a judge and two civil conciliation commissioners,139
conducts hearings for the parties in dispute.140 If the parties
reach an agreement, the committee documents and files the res-
olution, which has the same legal effect as a court judgment."'
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the judge has
the authority to recommend a resolution. 42 The judge's deci-
sion, however, is only binding on the parties if they choose to
accept the judge's terms. 4 '
Japanese administrative bodies with quasi-judicial power14 4
and various private non-for-profit institutions employ concilia-
tion systems less formal than the chotei process.' 45 The Center
for Settlement of Traffic Accident Disputes 46 (the "Center") is
an example of a private non-for-profit organization that per-
forms conciliation services.147 The Center receives funding from
the Association of Marine and Fire Insurance Companies, but
acts independently and retains more than 100 attorneys on a
part-time basis.' 48 When a claimant goes to the Center to settle a
dispute, the Center contacts the opposing party, usually an insur-
ance company representative, and encourages the parties to rec-
oncile their differences.' 49 If necessary, the parties may proceed
cation Law. Id. The aim of the Law on Civil Conciliation is "the resolution of disputes
through mutual concession of the parties by way of taking into account 'actual state of
affairs and in conformity with reason.'" Id.
138. ODA, supra note 26, at 83. Even if a litigant chooses to file a law suit, the court
may require the case to be solved by chotei. Id.
139. Id. The Supreme Court appoints civil conciliation commissioners for two
year terms. Id. The commissioners are part-time government employees, between the
ages of 40 and 69. Id. The role of the commissioners often eliminates the need for
lawyers to take part in the proceedings. Young, supra note 117, at 914.
140. ODA, supra note 26, at 83.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 84.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 85. As another example of an administrative body, the Coordinating
Commission for Pollution, established in 1970 as a commission attached to the Prime
Minister's Office, has quasi-judicial power to mediate disputes concerning pollution.
Id. Since 1971, the Commission has mediated 592 cases. Id.
145. ODA, supra note 26, at 85.
146. Id. In 1988, the Center advised on 12,445 cases, 1,934 of which reached com-
promise before being forwarded to the conciliation board. Id. at 86. In most cases, the
center settles disputes after four or five meetings. Id.




to mediation with one of the Center's attorneys. 150 If the parties
fail to reach an agreement with the aid of an attorney, they may
ask the Center's conciliation board, composed of both attorneys
and law professors, to make a recommendation. 15' The recom-
mendation is binding on the insurance company but not on the
victim. 152
Arbitration also exists in Japan but is less popular than con-
ciliation.'53 Arbitration is less frequently used because, unlike
conciliation, if parties in dispute are unable to reach an agree-
ment, the arbitrator is empowered to reach his own agreement
and enforce it upon the parties. 154 A party may request a court
to invalidate an arbitration decision when an arbitrator deviates
from the procedure outlined in the Japanese Civil Code. 55
Commentators argue, however, that arbitration rules in the Civil
Code are vague, which creates difficulty for parties attempting to
prove an arbitrator did not follow the proper rules of proce-
dure. 56
C. Japanese Products Liability Before the PL Law and Factors
Leading to the Law's Enactment
Before the PL Law's enactment, the Civil Code made no
mention of the concept of product liability, 157 and Japan's
judges, who function under a civil law system, did not have the
same power of statutory interpretation as judges working in com-
mon law systems.' 58 With the exception of major environmental
and pharmaceutical mass tort suits, 15 Japan's judges dismissed
most product liability suits brought under the provisions of the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. ODA, supra note 26, at 85-86.
153. Young, supra note 117, at 912; ODA, supra note 26, at 85 (noting between
1980 and 1990 only 65 cases were filed with Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion).
154. Young, supra note 117, at 912.
155. Minsoho art. 801, Law No. 29 Of 1890 (Japan).
156. Id.
157. See M]NPo art. 709 and art. 415, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898
(Japan) (describing basic negligence and contract theories).
158. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 56.
159. See O'Brien, supra note 86, at 15 (noting that although there are few reported
product liability decisions in Japan, there have been some highly publicized mass-tort
suits).
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Civil Code.1 6 ° In spite of the lack of legislation protecting the
rights of product liability claimants, the Japanese government
1 61
and businesses leaders 62 lobbied against the enactment of the
PL Law for more than twenty years.163 These leaders attempted
to keep strict liability out of Japan by denouncing the concept as
a foreign and unnecessary legal protection forJapanese consum-
ers. 164 Recent economic, 165 social, 16 6 and political16 v changes in
Japan, however, weakened the persuasiveness of the opposition
and paved the way for the PL Law's enactment.
168
1. Japanese Product Liability System Prior to the PL Law
Because the Japanese Civil Code, prior to the enactment of
the PL Law, provided no explicit rules or theories for product
liability actions,169 Japanese litigants had to bring product defect
claims under the general provisions of contract law 170 or negli-
160. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 327 n.54 (noting that by 1981, only fifty
cases had been brought by consumers against manufacturers).
161. See Yuko Inoue, LDP Officials Fear Confusion from Law, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 12,
1992, at 8 [hereinafter LDP Officials] (explaining how head of Liberal Democratic
Party's ("LDP") product liability law study group concluded product liability law would
interfere with Japan's existing product safety system and engender surge in irrational
consumer complaints).
162. Yuko Inoue, Controversy Heightens in Debate Over Product Liability Law: Industy
Initiates Opposition Campaign, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 12, 1992 at 1 [hereinafter Controversy
Heightens] (discussing how top corporate officials resisted PL Law by arguing consumers
were already well protected).
163. Toshihiro Mitsui, Product Liability in Japan: Background and Comments, PROD-
ucr LIABILITY INTERNATIONAL 99 (July 1995).
164. See Nakamura Interview, supra note 114 (describing reasons why government
and business leaders believed PL Law was unnecessary). Business and government lead-
ers often cited tendency of Japanese manufacturers to employ strict quality control sys-
tems, existence of government initiated product safety system, and preference of con-
sumers to utilize ADR methods instead of litigation as reasons why a product liability
law was unnecessary for Japan. Id.
165. Hirsh & Henry, supra note 9, at 11-13 (describing how Japan's five year eco-
nomic downturn is fostering major structural changes in Japanese economy).
166. Todd Crowell, supra note 14 (discussing new demands of Japanese consum-
ers).
167. Michael Blaker, Japan In 1994: Out With the Old, In With the New?, ASIAN SUR-
VEY, Jan. 1995 (explaining fall of LDP and end of unresponsive Japanese politics).
168. Shichi Interview, supra note 114.
169. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 678; Mitsui, supra note 163, at 99;
Toshihide Shichi, Why Product Liability Litigation is About to Increase, INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCIAL LITIGATION 16 (February 1996) [hereinafter Product Liability Litigation Increase];
O'Brien, supra note 86, at 14; Marcuse, supra note 18, at 370.
170. Zentaro Kitagawa, Products Liability, in DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN XIII 4.06[1],
4.06[2] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1989). Applicable contract law is found in Article 415 of
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gence-based tort law.' 1 ' The high burden of proof under these
theories prevented most individual plaintiffs from litigating suc-
cessfully.' 7 2 Prior to the PL Law, almost all successful product
liability litigants were involved in mass tort suits. 173 The number
of mass tort suits was small, however, which allowed Japanese
manufacturers to operate largely without the risk of litigation. 174
The Japanese judiciary, thus, was unable to play a large role in
inducing manufacturers to produce safer products.1 75 Instead,
the Japanese government directed product safety by regulating
product standards and determining levels of safety. 1 76 Many ob-
servers argue that governmental regulation of product safety ad-
versely affected the Japanese economy by preventing manufac-
turers from selling lower quality, less expensive goods.1 77
a. PL Legal Theories: Breach of Contract and Negligence
in Tort
Articles 41517' and 570179 of the Japanese Civil Code pro-
vide the basis for product liability claims under contract the-
ory.1 ° Article 415 allows a buyer of goods to recover from the
seller when the product is not fit for the purpose for which it is
sold. 81 A defective product falls under this standard if a claim-
ant can establish foreseeability of harm and adequate causa-
tion.18 2 Article 570 allows buyers to recover even if they are un-
the Civil Code as follows: " [i]f an obligor fails to perform in accordance with the main
sense of the obligation-duty, the obligee may demand compensation for damages; the
same shall apply in cases where performance becomes impossible for any reason imput-
able to the obligor." MINPO art. 415, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Ja-
pan).
171. O'Brien, supra note 86, at 14. Applicable tort law is found in Article 709 of
the Civil Code as follows: "A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom." MINPO art.
709, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
172. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 373-74.
173. Id.
174. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 82.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 124-29.
177. Id. at 129-30.
178. MINPO art. 415, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
179. MINPo art. 570, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
180. MINPo art. 415 and art. 570, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Ja-
pan).
181. MINPO art. 415, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
182. Id.
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able to prove foreseeability, such as in the case of a latent de-
fect.183 Article 570, however, limits damages to the value of the
product itself and does not provide for personal injury or other
property or economic loss.
18 4
Under Japanese contract law, there are two major hurdles
for plaintiffs attempting to recover for product liability claims.18 5
First, Japanese courts require privity of contract 86 between the
seller and the immediate buyer in any suit based on a breach of
contract. 187 Privity of contract, a legal theory which courts in the
United States have not used for more than thirty years,188 pre-
vents Japanese litigants from recovering against manufacturers
in most cases because it is rare for buyers to have contracts with
manufacturers. 189 Second, Japanese retailers often include dis-
claimers in sales agreements to limit their liability in product de-
fect suits.' 9 ° Although the concept of recovering under contract
183. MINPO art. 570, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (Japan).
184. Id.
185. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 684-85.
186. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990). "Privily of contract" is the rela-
tionship that exists between two or more contracting parties. Id.
187. Id.
188. SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JAPANESE COMPANIES 3 (2d. ed. 1995) [hereinafter SIMPSON,
THATCHER & BARTLETT]. Until the early 1900s, product liability law in the United States
was closely tied to contract law. Id. For a plaintiff to recover for injuries caused by a
defective product, the plaintiff was required to be in contractual privity with the manu-
facturer. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109 (1842) (denying mail coach driver
recovery against coach manufacturer for his injuries caused by defect in coach because
mail coach driver's employer, and not mail coach driver, was in privity of contract with
manufacturer). The privity requirement rested on the basic premise that it was better
for a customer to suffer than for a manufacturer to be burdened with liability to an
unlimited number of potential claimants. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
682 (5th ed. 1984). Courts in the United States began to abolish the privity of contract
requirement soon after Winterbottom. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (hold-
ing manufacturers of "imminently dangerous" products, such as poison, owed duty of
care to anyone who may be injured by their products); Statler v. George A. Ray, 195 N.Y.
478 (1909) (removing privity of contract requirement for "inherently dangerous" prod-
ucts); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916) (abolishing privity of contract
requirement for plaintiffs injured by automobiles because automobiles are "reasonably
certain" to be dangerous if defective). After MacPherson, any plaintiff injured by a de-
fective product could recover against a negligent defendant. SIMPSON THATCHER &
BARTLETT, supra, at 5. Not only did the plaintiff no longer have to prove privity of
contract, but he also no longer had to prove that he even purchased or used the defec-
tive product. Id.
189. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 684.
190. Id. at 685. Disclaimers in sales transactions are allowed in Japan as long as
they do not violate Article 1 of the Civil Code. Id. Article 1 provides that "[a]ll private
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law exists for product defects in Japan, such recovery remains an
elusive goal for the average product liability plaintiff.19'
Before the enactment of the PL Law, most claimants
brought product liability actions in tort law under Article 709 of
the Civil Code. 92 Article 709 provides for general negligence
principles which allowed judges to apply Article 709 to product
liability 'cases. 193 To prove negligence, Japanese litigants must
show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of duty, breach of
duty, injury, and causation. 194 In Japan, as in the United States,
plaintiffs may bring negligence actions under several theories
such as negligent manufacture, 195 negligent design,196 and negli-
gent warning.1 97 Japanese law recognizes comparative negli-
rights shall conform to the public welfare" and "shall be done in good faith and in
accordance with the principles of trust." MINPO art. 1. A manufacturer's warranty is
ineffective if the manufacturer has knowledge of a defect and fails to disclose the infor-
mation to the buyer. MINPO art. 572, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898 (a-
pan).
191. Id.; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 45.
192. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 32. Article 709 provides that "[a] person
who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is bound to make compen-
sation for damage arising therefrom." MINPO art. 709, Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No.
9 of 1898 (Japan).
193. Ponte, supra note 19, at 661.
194. Id. at 661-62. To prove negligence a plaintiff must specifically show (1) the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached a duty of
reasonable care, (3) the defendant negligently sold or manufactured a defective prod-
uct, (4) the plaintiff suffered an injury, and (5) the defendant's product caused the
injury. Id.
195. Id. at 662; Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 329. To prove that a product was
defective due to a manufacturing defect, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer
failed to use reasonable care in making the product or in inspecting the product to
discover any flaws. SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT, supra note 188, at 19. Plaintiffs
generally attempt to prove that the manufacturer's inspection process failed or was in-
adequate. Id.
196. Ponte, supra note 19, at 662; See Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 329 (ex-
plaining Japanese litigants may sue on theory of negligence in design as may their U.S.
counterparts). To prove that a manufacturer negligently designed a product, the plain-
tiff must show that the manufacturer failed to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a design for its product. SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT, supra note 188, at 20. The
plaintiff must establish that the manufacturer knew or should have known that its de-
sign would render the product unreasonably dangerous for its intended and foresee-
able uses. Id.
197. Ponte, supra note 19, at 662; See Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 329 (ex-
plaining Japanese litigants may sue on theory of negligence in warning as may their U.S.
counterparts). To prove that a manufacturer negligently failed to warn users of the
risks associated with its product, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the product's risks and that the manufacturer failed to provide
adequate warnings of such risks. SIMPSON THATCHER & BARTLETT, supra note 188, at 21.
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gence1 98 but does not recognize contributory negligence. 99 De-
spite the availability of bringing suit under negligence theories,
most Japanese litigants fail to establish the existence of negli-
gence beyond a reasonable doubt because of the limited discov-
ery system and lack of attorneys willing to represent plaintiffs'
cases.
200
b. Overview of Product Liability Cases in Japan Before the
Enactment of the PL Law
Prior to the passage of the PL Law, almost all of the success-
ful product liability cases in Japan involved suits arising from
mass disasters in which plaintiffs brought their claims collec-
tively. 21 A review of Japanese product liability case law indicates
that plaintiffs involved in mass tort suits often succeeded because
judges reduced the burden necessary for proving negligence.20 2
In cases involving individual plaintiffs, however, judges were less
likely to alter the elements needed to prove negligence and
plaintiffs were unable to meet their burdens of proof because of
their inability to access necessary information from the defend-
ants.
203
Critics, who argued Japan did not need a strict liability sys-
tem, attempted to prove the workings of the negligence system
by highlighting famous product liability cases, such as the
Morinaga dairy case,20 4 Thalidomide case,20 5 SMON case,26
Even if a manufacturer provided warnings with its product, a plaintiff can recover for
"failure to warn" by proving the warnings were inadequate. Id.
198. Ponte, supra note 19, at 663. Comparative negligence is the allocation of re-
sponsibility for damages incurred between the plaintiff and defendant, based on the
relative negligence of the two. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990). Under the
theory of comparative negligence, a reduction of damages is to be recovered by the
negligent plaintiff in proportion to his fault. Id.
199. Ponte, supra note 19, at 662. Contributory negligence exists where the plain-
tiffs conduct is a legally contributing cause in addition to the negligence of the defend-
ant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
At common law, any degree of contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff would
completely bar recovery by the plaintiff. Id. Now, most states follow a comparative
negligence approach to allocating fault. Id.
200. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 680; Ponte, supra note 19, at 662.
201. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 55.
202. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 373-75.
203. Ponte, supra note 19, at 661; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90 (arguing that
before PL Law only plaintiffs in large cases received preferential treatment by judges
who used abstract form of negligence was applied).
204. Japan v. Ooka, 365 HANREI JIHO 7 (Tokushima Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 1963), rev'd
1997]
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Kanemi case,2 °7 and the most recent HIV litigation.2 °s Many
and remanded, 447 HANREI JIHo 31 (Takamatsu High Ct., Mar. 31, 1966), appeal dis-
missed, 547 HANREI JIHO 92 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969); 302 HANREI TAMUZU 123 (Toku-
shima Dist. Ct., Nov. 28 1973). In the Morinaga Dairy cases, twelve thousand infants
became sick, and many later died, by drinking arsenic-tainted milk. Id. This case was
settled out of court and the defendants agreed to set up a fund to pay for the medical
costs of the injured plaintiffs. Id.
205. Kubota v. Kanemi Soko K.K., 866 HANREI JIHo 21 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Oct. 5,
1977); Noguchi v. Kanemi Soko K.K., 881 HANREi JIHO 17 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Kokura Br.,
Mar. 10, 1978). In the thalidomide cases, babies were born with injuries due to side
effects of fertility drugs. Id. Here, sixty-three families sued the government and the
manufacturers of the drug Isomin for their negligence in producing drugs containing
thalidomide. Id. None of the plaintiffs in the thalidomide cases brought suits individu-
ally. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 48. Id. Instead of being represented by private
attorneys, all of the plaintiffs were represented by legal aid organizations such as the
Kyoto Civil Liberties Union and the Tokyo Civil Liberties Union. Id. The plaintiffs, the
government, and the manufacturer eventually settled out of court. Id. at 50.
206. Yagi v. State, 879 HANREIJIHO 26 (Kanazawa Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 1978); Oyama v.
State, 899 HANREIJiHo 48 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 3, 1978); Ochi v. State, 910 HANREIJIHO
33 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Nov. 14, 1978); Aoyama v. State, 910 HANREI JIHO 19 (Hiroshima
Dist. Ct., Feb. 2 1979). The SMON (subacute myelo-optico neuropathy) cases are other
examples where Japanese trial judges reduced the burden of proof for plaintiffs in a
mass tort situation. Id. Here, in 1964, a drug used to treat bowel disease caused neuro-
logical suffering to around 10,000 people. Id. The Kanazawa District Court held in
1978 that the manufacturers were negligent under Article 709 by concluding that the
manufacturers would have noticed the damaging effect of one of the ingredients in
the drug if the manufacturers had exercised a high degree of care. Id. The court here
basically inferred the manufacturers' negligence from the circumstances despite the
plaintiffs' inability to clearly prove negligence. Id.
207. Id. In 1968, in the Kanemi rice oil case, more than fourteen thousand plain-
tiffs brought suit after sustaining damage to their kidney and nervous systems after eat-
ing food cooked with rice oil contaminated with PCB (polychlorinated biphenyl). Id.
The contamination occurred when PCB, which was being used in the manufacturing
process of heat oil, leaked into the rice oil through a hole in a corrosive heating pipe.
Id. The plaintiffs filed tort actions against the cooking oil company, the manufacturer
of PCB, and the government. Id. In order to give the plaintiffs leverage in the suits, the
court created a "special negligence" rule which created a presumption of fault and
shifted the burden of proof. Id. The court held that the supplier of PCB was negligent
for failing to warn about the potential danger of PCB to the food manufacturer. Id.
208. Sugiyama Interview, supra note 114. The HIV litigation involved more than
100 hemophiliac plaintiffs who were infected with HIV through the use of tainted blood
products. Id. The plaintiffs sued the Japanese government and five pharmaceutical
companies. Id. The first group of plaintiffs reached settlement in 1996, seven years
after the trials began. Id. Plaintiffs had difficulty proving negligence because of their
need to prove that the harm was foreseeable and that the harm could have been
avoided given the knowledge at the time. Id. Because evidence was difficult on these
issues, the courts stretched their application of negligence to rule in the plaintiffs favor.
Id. If the PL Law had been in effect, the plaintiffs would have had a much easier case
because the burden would have been reversed. Id. Instead of the plaintiffs' needing to
prove foreseeability and avoidability, the defendants would have had to prove lack of
foreseeability and avoidability as their defenses. Id. Although the result would have
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proponents of the PL Law note that these cases, in which prod-
uct liability plaintiffs were successful, are exceptions because the
plaintiffs were represented by public interest organizations
rather than individual attorneys. 20 9 Observers argue that these
cases, therefore, do not represent the difficulties that isolated
plaintiffs confront in pursuing product liability litigation under
negligence theory.210 For example, in the famous mass tort
cases, Japanese courts lowered the plaintiffs' burdens of proof by
inferring negligence and admitting statistical evidence.2 11 More-
over, as these cases gained widespread public attention, the gov-
ernment assisted the plaintiffs in collecting necessary evi-
dence.2 12
Observers argue that under the negligence system, litigants
had the best chance for recovery if they were involved in situa-
tions where the injury was widespread. 1 Plaintiffs without
group support and national attention, however, were rarely able
to prove causation and fault.214 Although this approach com-
ported with a Japanese tendency to protect group rights, it of-
fered little justice for isolated claimants.2 15
c. Governmental Regulation of Product Safety
The legal systems of the United States and Japan follow dif-
ferent approaches in encouraging manufacturers to promote
product safety.2 1 6 In the United States, the judicial system plays
a large role in creating strong incentives for American manufac-
turers to reduce product risks.2 17 U.S. courts have accomplished
most likely turned out the same under strict liability theory, the judges would not have
had to stretch their application of the law. Id. Moreover, the process would have been
different because the plaintiff would not have had to prove the defendants' fault. Id.
209. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 55.
210. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 375; Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 327 (discuss-
ing before enactment of PL Law "little attention was paid to the plight of the isolated
plaintiff and his difficulties in proving his case."). Isolated plaintiffs are at a disadvan-
tage because they do not have access to data demonstrating the extent of the product
safety risk. Id.
211. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 374.
212. Id.
213. Id. ("Plaintiffs in mass-tort suits and large-scale products liability cases have
been uniformly successful, whether by rendered verdict or negotiated settlement.").
214. ODA, supra note 26, at 130.
215. Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90.
216. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 79-80.
217. Id.
19971
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this by significantly reducing consumers' burden of proof
against manufacturers in product defect cases and by requiring
manufacturers to pay large damage awards, including punitive
damages, to consumers injured by their products.2 1
In Japan, because few product liability cases have been
brought and damage awards have been limited, Japanese manu-
facturers have not been as concerned with the cost of litigation
or the repercussions associated with product defects. 219 As a re-
sult, the Japanese judiciary has not provided much incentive to
Japanese manufacturers to increase the safety of their prod-
ucts. 2 2 0 Instead, the Japanese government has assumed a large
role in regulating the activities of manufacturers.221 Japanese
consumers, therefore, rely on regulations imposed by govern-
mental agencies, 222 rather than legal protection from the courts,
to shield them from defective products. 22
13
The Japanese government implements and oversees a struc-
tured regulatory scheme that imposes standards for product
safety.224 The governmental standards focus on uniformity of
product quality and design within the Japanese marketplace.225
Foreign manufacturers and governments criticize that these reg-
ulations are non-tariff barriers226 to imported goods because
218. Id. In the United States, because the pendulum may have swung too far
against manufacturers, the U.S. product liability system is now experiencing reform. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 123. The Japanese government established rigor-
ous product safety standards, including requirements for detailed design specifications
and strict certification procedures. Ponte, supra note 19, at 667.
222. Ponte, supra note 19, at 668 (mentioning role of governmental agencies in
licensing and certifying products and supervising design and manufacturing activities of
industries they regulate).
223. Ponte, supra note 19, at 667-69 (stating "Japanese regulatory law relies heavily
on government action to protect consumers rather than encouraging private litigation
to enforce laws that protect the public."); Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 334-35;
Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 40.
224. Ponte, supra note 19, at 667-68.
225. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 348 (explaining that because many of Ja-
pan's laws regulate design of products rather than performance characteristics of prod-
ucts, some high performing goods may be rejected because of minor deviations from
design standards). As an example of this type of design regulation, American metal
baseball bats were denied entry into the Japanese market because they did not contain a
certain alloy and did not have rubber at the end of the bats. Id.
226. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 318-19 (explaining how government's regu-
lation of product safety constitutes non-tariff barriers to trade). Examples of non-tariff
barriers that result from governmental regulatory practices include government pro-
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they eliminate goods from the Japanese market that do not con-
form to the standards.22 7 The Japanese government reacts to
this criticism by explaining that a removal of such regulations
would result in a product safety system in which the government
would address safety through recalls and judicial procedures af-
ter accidents occur rather than through regulatory preven-
tion.228
Observers suggest thatJapanese consumers bear the burden
of Japan's tightly regulated product safety system by paying
higher prices for manufactured goods.229 Critics contend that
because lower quality, less expensive goods are blocked from the
market for failing to meet the government's standards, consum-
ers' choice of goods is limited.23 ° Observers also contend that
Japanese consumers are forced to pay for governmental regula-
tion through expensive inspection systems required on certain
consumer products, such as on automobiles. 2 11 Other observers
claim, however, thatJapanese consumers prefer the security they
derive from paternalistic government-imposed regulation rather
than being faced with choosing among products with varying de-
grees of safety.23 2
curement policies, customs practices, administrative guidance, and product standards
and certification requirements. Id. at 319.
227. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 367 n.247. See Ponte, supra note 19, at 668
(noting that United States has been requesting Japanese government to allow U.S. man-
ufacturers to self-certify that their goods comply with Japanese standards on safety).
"Japanese product standards and certification procedures have undeniably operated as
barriers to trade." Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 350-51.
228. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 124. Opponents of the structured regulatory
scheme indicate, however, that the Japanese regulatory system already is one which
deals with product defects after they occur since most of the regulations are enacted
"only after social problems related to defective products [are] highlighted by the pub-
lic (or consumer groups)." Id.
229. Id. at 125-26.
230. Id. (explaining Japanese regulations exclude inferior products from ever
reaching Japanese market because "extensive government intervention may narrow a
manufacturer's business practice options.").
231. Id. at 126. Japanese car owners must pay approximately US$1,000 once every
two years for inspection of cars between three and eleven years of age. Id. After a car
reaches eleven years of age, car owners must have their cars inspected every year. Id.
232. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 359. The authors note that:
In a society which is highly structured, it may be that consumers would prefer
that experts replace them in [deciding between safe and unsafe products].
The benefits of certainty, the avoidance of risk ... may be associated with the
view that 'freedom from risk of injury' is a merit which ought to be allocated
paternalistically rather than through the market.
Id. at 363-64.
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In addition to establishing product safety standards, the Jap-
anese government plays a role in the product liability sphere233
by implementing public insurance programs234 and compensa-
tion trust funds.235 The Safety Goods Mark System 236 ("SG Sys-
tem") is the hallmark of the Japanese public insurance pro-
gram.237 Created by the Japanese Consumer Product Safety As-
sociation ('JCPSA"),238 the SG System sets safety standards for
consumer products23 '9 and provides payment for damages caused
by products that have been approved by the SG System. 240 Man-
ufacturers who choose to participate in the SG System must ad-
here to JCPSA's design and production standards.24 ' Funding
for this program stems from the fees paid by participating manu-
233. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1848 (describing
howJapanese government enacted Consumer Products Safety Act in 1973 and through
it established Product Safety Council which created certain insurance programs for
products liability).
234. Ponte, supra note 19, at 670. Japanese public insurance programs, which en-
sure compensation for consumers injured by certain defective products, spread the risk
of loss among industry participants, employers, and the Japanese government. Id. Man-
ufacturers contributing to the insurance fund pay fixed premiums rather than face fu-
ture unknown damage awards. Id.
235. Id. Compensation trust funds, established by Japanese legislation, require
manufacturers in certain industries, such as pharmaceutical and consumer product
industries, to contribute to industry-wide funds. Id.
236. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 128-29; Products Liability Through Private Ordering,
supra note 19, at 1828-39. The SG System is a government-initiated product liability
insurance program for manufacturers that produce certain kinds of products. Products
Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1828.
237. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1834-36. Shortly
after the SG System was established, firms in industries outside the scope of the SG
System began similar, independent systems. Id. at 1835. The makers of large house-
hold items (such as kitchen cabinets and bathroom units) introduced the Better Living
label and toymakers began the Safety Toy label. Id. The golf club industry has created
a system for affixing safety stickers to golf products which meet certain specifications.
Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
238. Id. Japanese Consumer Product Safety Association ("JCPSA") is the govern-
ment agency responsible for implementing the SG mark system and other product lia-
bility insurance programs. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 127.
239. Id. Under the SG System, a committee of consumer group representatives,
manufacturer representatives, and other specialists decide safety standards for each
type of product to be covered by the insurance program. Id. at 128.
240. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1832-33. Claims
are paid quickly, sometimes within a month, under the SG System. Id. If a claimant can
show serious personal injury, the claimant can usually receive an initial award of Yen
600,000 as interim aid. Id. Even if the claimant fails to later prove his or her claim, he
can often keep the initial damages award. Id. By contrast, a claimant suing in court
usually has to wait at least five years before receiving any damages award. Id.
241. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 128.
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facturers.242
All products meeting JCPSA standards receive an identifi-
able logo, 24 3 which allows consumers to look for the label when
making purchases. 244 Consumers who purchase products with
the SG System logo receive insurance against product defects.2 45
If a defect occurs and a consumer becomes injured, the SG Sys-
tem indemnifies consumers after meeting a much less substan-
tial burden of proof than that which is required to prove negli-
gence in the courts. 2 4 6  Consumers seeking indemnification
from the SG System must only prove the existence of a defect
without having to prove the source of the defect.2 47 Critics argue
the SG System is overly selective by only including safer types of
products248 and, therefore, is inadequate in meeting the needs
of a diverse product base. 249 Critics also demonstrate that con-
sumers do not widely utilize the claim system.250
The Japanese government has also passed legislation to re-
quire certain industries to establish compensation trust funds to
provide compensation for injured plaintiffs. 25' The funds cover
specific industries, such as pharmaceutical or consumer prod-
ucts, and demand mandatory contributions from certain manu-
242. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 335-36; Sarumida, supra note 86, at 128.
243. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1829. Once a prod-
uct meets the safety standards, the manufacturer of the product has the right to attach
an "SG" label to its product. Id.
244. Id. at 1838-39. Most consumers who pay the additional cost for "SG" products
are more interested in the added safety they expect from the products, rather than the
insurance that comes with the products. Id.
245. Id. at 1830. Products sold under the SG System essentially come with a prod-
uct-liability insurance contract. Id. Consumers injured by defective SG goods are paid
specific amounts under the insurance program. Id.
246. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1831. Manufactur-
ers choosing to participate in the SG System raise the legal standard by which they are
bound because the system replaces the negligence standard with a much easier burden
of proof for consumers. Id.
247. Id. To prove a claim under the SG System, a claimant must show that the
product had been defective, that he or she had been injured, and that the defect had
caused the injuries. Id. In analyzing an SG System claim, the JCSPA basically adheres
to the philosophy that if a product became defective in the course of normal use, dam-
ages should be paid. Id.
248. Products Liability Through Private Ordering, supra note 19, at 1831.
249. Id. at 1838 (claiming "The SG [S]ystem covers only a small segment of the
Japanese economy and disproportionately covers the safer products ....").
250. Id. Between 1987 and 1991, 727 cases have been investigated and only 339
cases have resulted in insurance payouts. Id.
251. Ponte, supra note 19, at 670.
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facturers.2 5 2 The funds fix recovery amounts and collect premi-
ums from manufacturers in proportion to their share of the mar-
ket.253 To recover under the funds, plaintiffs are not required to
show fault, or identify the manufacturer. 254  Claimants' recov-
eries, however, are less than court-awarded damages. 255
2. The Process of Enacting the PL Law
After twenty years of consideration, the Diet enacted the PL
Law in 1994.256 Fearful that the PL Law would stir a boom in
frivolous product liability suits and subsequently increase corpo-
rate costs, leaders opposed the PL Law for many years.257 Once
much of the industrialized world enacted product liability laws,
however, the Japanese government decided to follow the global
trend by enacting its own statute.258
a. Legislative History: Twenty Years in the Making
The enactment of Japan's PL Law involved years of debate
and negotiation. 25' The Japanese government studied the no-
tion of strict liability for two decades before enacting the PL
252. Id.
253. Id. One compensation fund was set up in the pharmaceutical industry after
the SMON cases. Id. at 671. The pharmaceutical trust fund required contributions
from domestic manufacturers, drug importers, and the government. Id. The trust fund
contained a fixed schedule of benefits for medical expenses, disability allowances, and
death benefits. Id.
254. Id. at 671. If a plaintiff can prove a particular manufacturer to be negligent,
the plaintiff must pursue tort remedies and may not rely on compensation from the
trust fund. Id. The compensation trust funds allow plaintiffs who are unable to identify
defendants to receive some level of compensation. Id.
255. Id.; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 53 n. 124; Cohen & Martin, supra note 4,
at 336-37.
256. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 688-89 (explaining origins of PL Law);
Mitsui, supra note 163, at 99 (discussing twenty year process of enacting PL Law); Mar-
cuse, supra note 18, at 379-83 (tracing path of PL Law from original 1975 Draft).
257. Shichi Interview, supra note 114 (describing how Japanese government and
manufacturers feared U.S.-style litigation explosion would follow enactment of PL
Law).
258. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 380-81 (explaining how Japanese leaders eventu-
ally felt it was time to follow other countries' example and reform its product liability
system).
259. Controversy Heightens, supra note 162, at 1 (discussing push for enacting PL
Law amongJapanese lawyers, scholars, and consumer groups in face of opposition from
Japanese politicians, industry groups, and government agencies).
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Law.260 The first attempt to create new product liability legisla-
tion occurred as early as August 1975 when the Product Liability
Research Group 26 1 published the Draft Model Law2 62 ("1975
Draft") .26' The 1975 Draft highlighted the concept of strict lia-
bility and suggested radical procedural changes in such areas as
discovery.264 In 1976, the Japanese government's 6th Social Pol-
icy Council265 responded to the 1975 Draft and issued its own
final report recommending the introduction of strict liability.266
The Social Policy Council's proposal did not induce legislative
action and product liability reform remained a low government
priority for several years. 67
In 1985, the European Community's 268 ("EC") promulga-
tion of the EC Directive, 269 a charter calling for all Member
States to harmonize their product liability laws and enact prod-
uct liability statutes, revived Japanese interest in strict product
260. Product Liability Lawsuits, 1994 JEI REPORT, JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE OF
AMERICA, Jan. 21, 1994.
261. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 686-87. The Product Liability Research
Group is a nongovernmental group of lawyers and professors which studies product
liability issues. Id. Leading scholars in Japan, such as Professor S. Wagatsuma, formed
the group after the concept of strict liability was introduced in the United States in the
middle of the 1960s. Mitsui, supra note 162, at 99.
262. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 379-80. The 1975 Draft widened the scope of lia-
bility beyond manufacturers to include sellers and distributors. Id. The 1975 Draft also
proposed substantial procedural overhauls such as enforcement of compulsory discov-




265. Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100. The Social Policy Council is an advisory body
to the Japanese Prime Minister which addresses consumer issues, including the condi-
tions and problems of product liability in Japan. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Ponte, supra note 19, at 648. In 1957, several European nations formed the
EC, a "single market of common trade policies with harmonized national laws facilitat-
ing the unhampered movement of people, goods, and capital among the member
states." Id.
269. Id. The Council of Ministers of the EC introduces Directives on matters such
as consumer regulation, monetary systems, and trade policies. Id. EC Member States
are required to enact national laws in accordance with the directives by particular dead-
lines. Id. Realizing that inconsistent product liability laws among the Member States
would lead to the unequal protection of consumers, effect competition among produ-
cers, and possibly interfere with the free flow of goods, the EC debated the enactment
of a uniform product liability Directive for ten years. Id. Ultimately, in 1985 the EC
adopted a directive calling for member states to implement the theory of strict product
liability. Id. at 650.
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liability.270 Japanese leaders were more willing to reconsider the
concept once they witnessed the way in which the EC handled
the issue.27" They were also no longer able to avoid responsibil-
ity in this area by claiming that strict liability could only work in
the United States, the country in which the concept evolved.2 7 2
Five new proposals for strict liability were written between
February 1990 and October 1991.27" Three different bills were
sent to the Diet by the end of April 1994.274 Due to opposition
from the business community, however, the Social Policy Coun-
cil was again unable to reach a consensus and concluded that
the ministries should continue to examine the matter and issue a
final report to the Prime Minister during the Diet's next ses-
sion.2 7 5 After several levels of negotiations and studies, the Cabi-
net approved a product liability bill in April 1994.276 The Diet
ultimately enacted the law in July 1994 and, after a one year
grace period, the PL Law became effective on July 1, 1995.277
b. Opposition to the Enactment of the PL Law
Strong opposition stood in the way of Japan's enactment of
the PL Law.278 For many years, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry279 ("MITI") and the ruling Liberal Demo-:
270. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 688-89; Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100.
271. Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100. Japanese feel more closely connected with
European code law than U.S. law due to the similarities in Europe and Japan's legisla-
tive systems. Id. The Japanese are better able to understand Europe's statutory ap-
proach to product liability than the U.S. case law approach. Id. In particular, the Japa-
nese have difficulty understanding the diverging standards for product liability that ex-
ist among the states. Id.
272. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 21, at 29 n.I. In the decision of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), California began
shifting the U.S. product liability system from a negligence and warranty theory-based
system to a strict liability system. Id. In 1965, the American Law Institute published
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which serves as a guide for courts in
applying strict liability. Id.
273. Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.; Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 688-89.
277. Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100.
278. Controversy Heightens, supra note 162, at 1; LDP Officials, supra note 161, at 8;
Mihoko lida, Foreign Access Linked to Product-Liability Law; Tougher Statute Coupled With
Easing of Regulations Suggested in New Government Report, Nit, ti WiLu., July 11, 1992;
Sarumida, supra note 86, at 83.
279. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 83. The Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry ("MITI") is the most powerful ministry with regard to Japanese industrial and
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cratic Party28° ("LDP") opposed the enactment of the PL Law by
arguing the Japanese people did not need the law.281 Compar-
ing Japanese consumers with their counterparts in the United
States, Japanese government leaders claimed Japanese consum-
ers did not need the additional protection of strict liability be-
cause the Japanese government enforced high safety standards
which better protected Japanese consumers.282 Leaders also
claimed that Japan's extensive ADR system provided consumers
with adequate mechanisms for recovery and obviated the need
for the PL Law.28 3
Japanese manufacturers resisted the PL Law by arguing the
law would incite a boom of irrational claims and frivolous law-
suits. 284 Manufacturers argued that product costs would in-
economic policies. Id. For many years, MITI protested enacting product liability legis-
lation because it maintained that Japanese consumers were already adequately pro-
tected by existing safety standards. Id.
280. LDP Officials, supra note 161, at 8. The LDP was the uninterrupted dominant
political party in Japan since its founding in 1955 until its first defeat in 1993. Hsu,
supra note 2, at 222. Before the Diet passed the PL Law, the ruling LDP claimed the law
would "confuse" Japanese society. LDP Officials, supra note 161, at 8. Yoshiro Hayashi,
head of the LDP's study group on the PL Law, forecasted that the PL Law would not be
advantageous for Japanese society. Id. In discussing potential disadvantages, Mr.
Hayashi cited conflicts with the already existing governmental regulation system, a
sharp increase in "irrational" consumer complaints, and a likely slowdown in technol-
ogy innovation. Id. To demonstrate thatJapan's level of consumer protection was ade-
quate without the PL Law, Mr. Hayashi illustrated that many pollution victims eventu-
ally won their cases. Id.
281. Ponte, supra note 19, at 660 (discussing that Japanese government once
claimed product liability law would "disrupt a necessary balance between consumer and
business interests."). Id. The government also asserted that negligence law was ade-
quate for plaintiffs to bring product defect cases and warned that imposing strict liabil-
ity would "lead to judicial system abuses and consumer price increases." Id.
282. Controversy Heightens, supra note 162, at 1. The government stressed its coop-
erative relationship with the business sector in trying to show why a product liability law
was unnecessary. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 129-30. The government explained it was
able to emphasize "the national interest" and seek consensus among relevant corpora-
tions when determining the scope of product safety regulations. Id. Critics claim the
real reason the government resisted the PL Law was because it desired Japanese manu-
facturers to maintain a competitive edge in product innovation and cost over European
and U.S. manufacturers who were burdened by the restraints of their countries' prod-
uct liability laws. Yuko Inoue, Consumers Press for More Protection: Efforts Stepped up to Enact
a Japan Law on Products Liability, NIHON KEIZAi SHIMBUN, Dec. 22, 1990, at 4.
283. Controversy Heightens, supra note 162, at 1.
284. Id. In expressing their fear about the potential increase of frivolous lawsuits,
Japanese corporate officials said Japanese gangsters could take advantage of the PL Law
by threatening to sue unless they are paid off. Iida, supra note 278, at 3.
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crease285 and product development would be impeded.28 6 Man-
ufacturers also claimed that because of their greater emphasis
on quality control, compared with their counterparts in the
United States, there was less chance of product defects, and,
thus, less need for the PL Law.28 7
c. Factors Leading to the PL Law's Enactment
A confluence of several international and domestic factors
in 1994 served as the catalyst for the government's passage of the
PL Law. 88 On the international front, once the EC enacted the
EC Directive on strict product liability, Japan became the only
industrialized country without such a law.28 9 The Japanese gov-
ernment decided, in the spirit of global convergence, 290 to fol-
low trends in product liability and consumer protection among
the other industrialized countries and enact its own product lia-
bility statute.29 Equally as important as international influences,
285. Product Liability Lawsuits, supra note 260 (mentioning increase in lawsuits
would result in additional costs to manufacturers).
286. Controversy Heightens, supra note 162, at 1.
287. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 135-37. 'Japanese manufacturers are more inter-
ested in quality control-related methods for their product safety practices than U.S.
manufacturers." Id. It is believed, moreover, that Japanese consumers demand and
expect higher quality products than consumers in other parts of the world. Id. As a
result, many Japanese manufacturers implement one hundred percent inspection pro-
grams instead of random-sampling methods. Id. Japanese manufacturers' ability to
maintain a close rapport with part assists them in reaching high quality standards. Id.
288. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 381-82 (describing how combination of domestic
and international factors eventually overcome opposition in Japan to allow for PL Law's
promulgation).
289. Mihoko lida, Delay on Product-Liability Draws Fire; While Businesses Applaud, Con-
sumer Groups Decry Decision by Council to Put Off Recommendation, NIKKEI WKLv., Oct. 26,
1992, at 4 [hereinafter Product-Liability Draws Fire] (stating 'Japan is the only industrial-
ized country without [a product liability] law.").
290. Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative
and International Perspective, 20 FORDIHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 401 (1996). The concept of
convergence means that:
[T]echnological, economic, and political factors are forcing the integra-
tion of national economies and a decline in the importance of nation states as
economic and social units.
To the extent that national regulatory styles remain distinct and particu-
laristic, however, they pose a challenge to the deep economic integration and
social convergence that many commentators seem to assume are inevitable.
Id. at 401.
291. See Marcuse, supra note 18, at 380-81 (explaining how EC Directive rekindled
Japanese interest in enacting strict liability statute). Many representatives of manufac-
turers, sales and services industries ultimately saw reforming Japan's product liability
system as a "trend of the times." Id.
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domestic changes in Japan's economic and political systems
played a large role in encouraging the Japanese government to
enact the PL Law.2" 2
1. International Influences
Observers of Japan agree that gaiatsu,293 outside influence,
is often the catalyst for creating change inside Japan.29 4 In the
product liability context, actions taken by other industrialized
countries influenced the Japanese government to reform its
product liability system.295 The EC directive of 1985 strongly in-
fluenced Japanese legislators,296 as did the promulgation of new
product liability laws throughout Asia. 9 7 The Japanese govern-
ment did not want to be the only industrialized country without
a product liability statute. 9 8
Moreover, the Japanese Diet enacted the PL Law to reduce
292. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 382 (discussing Japan's product liability system had
to be overhauled to address incongruencies in balance of consumer and industry
power). "In these times when the balance of consumer and industry power has under-
gone drastic changes, a law that will guarantee equality between these groups is a neces-
sity." Kazuko Miyamoto, Seizobutsu ni yoru higai o doo kyusai suru no ka? [How Should
Product-Related Injuries Be Compensated?], EKONOMISUTO, Dec. 17, 1991, at 22, 27.
293. Hsu, supra note 2, at 26 (describing how Japanese system has until now
"proved almost constitutionally unable to reform itself without the exerting of foreign
pressure or gaiatsu.").
294. Id. One of the Ministry of Finance's top bureaucrats has been quoted as say-
ing:
It is market competition, especially international competition, and so-
called gaiatsu which have increasingly acted as forces for reform .... It is sad
in a certain sense that there has been no large-scale systematic reform without
gaiatsu, but on the other hand, it is only normal that it is hard for a stable and
successful society to harness the energy for reform from within.
Id.
295. Product Liability Centers to Handle Consumer Cases, DAILYYOMIURI, Feb. 12, 1995.
"[The] passage of PL laws has become an international trend." Id. Japan felt the need
to follow other countries' PL Laws to avoid criticism thatJapan is an unfair player in the
global market. Id.
296. Ponte, supra note 19, at 618.
297. A Primer on Product Liability, JEI REPORT, Jan. 21, 1994 [hereinafter Primer on
Product Liability] (discussing recent enactment of product liability regimes in countries
of the European Union, Australia, Philippines, and People's Republic of China).
China's new product liability law spurred a sharp rise in lawsuits. Chinese Discover Product
Liability Suits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at BI. Since 1994, when China's product
liability law was introduced, product liability lawsuits have risen to more than half a
million annually. Id. Observers note that Chinese consumers are applying the product
liability law with a vengeance. Id. Rising Chinese consumer awareness is prompting
Chinese manufacturers to improve the quality of their products and services. Id. at B14.
298. Product-Liability Draws Fire, supra note 289, at 4.
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ongoing criticism that Japan's market is over-burdened with
non-tariff barriers.299 Commentators believed the enactment of
a product liability law would enable the government to ease its
regulation of consumer products, thus increasing foreign access
to Japan's market.3 00 In the eyes of the Japanese government,
the passage of the PL Law provided another example 0 1 of Ja-
pan's growing commitment to meeting international trade stan-
dards.30 2 The government also hoped the law would reduce for-
eign complaints that Japanese manufacturers unfairly enjoy a
cost advantage over American and European manufacturers by
not being burdened with the costs of a product liability law.303
2. Deregulation of Japan's Economy
Recent changes in Japan's domestic economy also helped
create the right environment for passage of the PL Law.30 4 Since
World War II, the Iron Triangle, 0 5 an interlocking relationship
among Japanese bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders,
facilitated the government's use of administrative guidance3 0 6 in
299. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 351 (discussing how Western businesses and
governments demand thatJapanese government needs to continue to implement mar-
ket-opening reforms.)
300. See generally Marcuse, supra note 18, at 381 (discussing how government and
industry observers saw new product liability statute as means of harmonizing Japan's
trade conditions); Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 317 (explaining it would be unreal-
istic for Japanese government to modify non-tariff barriers relating to product safety
regulation without substantially reforming Japan's product liability system).
301. Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 352-54 (discussing otherJapanese efforts to
reduce non-tariff barriers such as adoption of system which allows test data from outside
Japan, simplified approval procedures, and recognition of foreign laboratories for in-
spection and certification purposes).
302. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 381.
303. Id.
304. Hirsh & Henry, supra note 9, at 12 (discussing "the growing divergence be-
tween corporate, public, and private interests is probably the most important change in
Japan in the 1990s").
305. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 58, 63. The Iron Triangle system of governance
is often referred to as "Japan, Inc." Id. The Iron Triangle survived on the basis of the
LDP's reign of nearly 40 years. Nobuhito Kishi, Ministry of Ministries: Leader of Japan's
Bureaucracy Rushes to Keep Up With Current of Change, By THE WAY, July/Aug. 1994, at 47.
Within the workings of the Iron Triangle, corporations make political contributions to
entrenched LDP politicians who influence the bureaucrats which regulate the corpora-
tion's industries. Id. Many politicians are former bureaucrats which allows the lines
between bureaucrats and elected officials to be blurred and makes it easier for a system
of "give and take" to operate. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 59-60.
306. Upham, supra note 290, at 398. Administrative guidance is
[T]he tendency of all Japanese bureaucracies to prefer informal means of
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maintaining a highly regulated, export-driven economy. °7
While Japan experienced decades of high economic growth, the
interworkings of the Iron Triangle remained secure .30  Now,
however, as the Japanese economy remains mired in a pro-
longed recession, 9 business leaders are blaming the bureau-
cracy for overregulating their industries, 310 and the Iron Trian-
gle is beginning to unravel.3 1 1
These domestic pressures are making deregulation a na-
tional objective. 2 In a recent government press release, Japa-
policy implementation to formal ones. It includes the practice of an agency to
instruct private parties to take action that the agency does not have the legal
power to compel. In the economic context, this means a ministry's efforts to
extend its regulatory influence beyond its formal statutory power and to influ-
ence firm behavior to achieve economic results that are not supported by com-
pulsory enforcement power.
Id. In Japan, bureaucrats use administrative guidance to induce corporations to adopt
certain "voluntary" measures in exchange for awarding the corporations business
licenses, tax subsidies, and other privileges. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 58-59. Be-
cause bureaucrats retaliate against companies that resist their informal orders, compa-
nies are implicitly obligated to follow administrative guidance. Sarumida, supra note
86, at 129. In the product safety context, companies normally have no choice but to
follow safety directives regardless of the kind of product risks the ministries are target-
ing. Id.
307. WOLFEREN, supra note 66, at 58-60, 143-82.
308. Id.
309. Hirsh & Henry, supra note 9, at 12 (describing that "after five years of eco-
nomic stagnation, [it is] evident that the [economic] problems run deeper than a cycli-
cal downturn.").
310. See id. at 11 (stating that "[t]he message of the multinationals is this: The low
productivity and growth of this overregulated marketplace no longer works for us.").
Shoichiro Toyoda, chairman of Keidanren, Japan's most powerful business organiza-
tion stated that it is time to "rethink Japan, Inc." because Japan's economic and social
systems "have become largely ineffective and irrelevant." Id. at 12.
311. Hirsh & Henry, supra note 9, at 11 (explaining that goals of Japan's govern-
ment and giant corporations are diverging). Japanese companies are no longer able to
obey the workings of the Iron Triangle but must instead obey the competitiveness of
the global marketplace. Id. at 11. Many Japanese corporations are moving their pro-
duction facilities abroad to avoid regulation in their home market. Id. The bureau-
cracy is losing its grip on Japanese companies. Id. 'Japanese companies [are going]
abroad ... to escape their economy." Id.
312. New Big Wheel, supra note 14, at 34 (quoting Shoichiro Toyoda, Keidanren
chairman and Toyota Motor Corp. chairman, as saying "[a] t present, the most pressing
theme is deregulation."); All the PMs Men: A Council Makes the Tough Call, ASIAWEEK,Jan.
31, 1997 (stating "only a complete overhaul of [Japan's] industrial structure and gov-
ernment bureaucracy will guarantee Japan's prosperity in the 21st century"); Deregula-
tion Will Give Big, Quick Boost to Economy, supra note 14, at A] 9 (explaining Prime Minis-
ter Hashimoto has insisted deregulation will solve Japan's long-term economic
problems); Crowell, supra note 14 (explaining that "politicians, economic analysts and
businesspeople have unanimously agreed on the need to overhaul Japan's economy:
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nese leaders proposed a sweeping deregulation package that
aims to put Japan on the same deregulatory path the United
States has pursued during the last two decades.3" This plan calls
for reducing the size of Japan's bureaucracy and loosening re-
strictions on Japan's airlines, telephones, banks, brokerages, in-
surance, and other industries.3"4 Because deregulation will
weaken the government's ability to exert administrative gui-
dance over corporations and monitor safety standards," 5 Japa-
nese legislators enacted the PL Law to increase consumer pro-
tection.316
3. Japanese Political System Changes to Meet Needs
of Consumers
Long known for putting up with high prices and a relatively
low-standard of living for a country as wealthy as Japan, 17 Japa-
nese consumers are now looking for a better way of life.31 Re-
industries must be deregulated, monopolies broken up, government reorganized, bu-
reaucracies dismantled and the economy as a whole put on more free-market princi-
ples.").
313. Andrew Pollack, Deregulation in Japan: Too Many Rules, But Not For All, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at E14 [hereinafter Deregulation in Japan].
314. Id. Hashimoto has plans to reduce the number of ministries and agencies
from twenty-two to eleven and group their functions into four major categories such as
foreign policy, defense, welfare, and medical care. Crowell, supra note 14.
315. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 129-30 (stressing that because reducing regula-
tions is now main priority in Japan, product risks that were once eliminated by strict
government standardization and certification programs may now increase).
316. Sarumida, supra note 86, at 129-30; Cohen & Martin, supra note 4, at 365.
The commentators discuss that a strong bureaucracy is necessary to maintain Japan's
highly regulated product safety system by noting that:
Regulatory control of product quality and safety is reinforced by the magni-
tude and nature of bureaucratic power in Japan .... The co-operative struc-
ture of government-business relations as well as the interchange of personnel
between [government and business] suggest that regulatory supervision in Ja-
pan .. .may be generated by co-operative decisions of private industry and
state.
Id.
317. Norihiko Shimizu, Educate Japanese Consumers: Their Gain Will Be Your Gain,
ToKYo Bus. TODAY, June 1994, at 48. The low standard of living in Japan is evidenced
by the fact that Japanese must pay more for goods and services than almost any other
country. Id. Moreover, Japanese consumers are usually offered a more narrow range of
products and services than people in other countries. Id. Japanese consumers were
long unaware of the high prices they pay because of "the closed nature of the Japanese
market, the many regulations which conceal inefficiencies of the distribution system,
and governmental protection of the establishment which restricts real competition in
many sectors." Id.
318. See Crowell, supra note 14 (explaining that "[tihe Japanese people are fed up
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cent spending habits, by which consumers are disproving their
reputation of being ambivalent to high prices, are making dis-
count stores the only retailers to experience fast growth and
high profits in the past few years.3 19 As Japan continues to mod-
ernize and struggle through a recession, consumers are showing
a preference for less regulation and more freedom of choice in
the Japanese marketplace. 20
In 1993, consumers expressed their dissatisfaction with the
status quo by ousting the LDP from power for the first time since
World War 11.321 This political mandate paved the way for a
seven-party coalition led by Prime Minister Hosokawa to take
control of Japan.122 Backed by a strong consumer-oriented mo-
mentum, Prime Minister Hosokawa's regime had the support to
introduce the product liability bill that eventually became the PL
Law.3 23 The interplay of a growing consumer movement and
political change created a ripe environment for the passage of
the PL Law.324 Observers note that the PL Law is one of the
greatest accomplishments forJapan's consumer groups,3 25 which
have not had much power throughout Japan's history.3 26
Consumer demands for political and economic change have
with the archaic system of bureaucracy, keiretsu groupings, and government gui-
dance."). Id. "Consumption patterns are changing. The bursting of the bubble made
Japanese thriftier and less willing to pay exorbitant prices for products simply because
they were made in Japan." Id. After being exposed to more lower-priced foreign-made
goods, Japanese consumers may be less demanding of high quality goods. Sarumida,
supra note 86, at 138.
319. Shimizu, supra note 317, at 48. Before the current recession, "price [was] not
... the driving source in Uapanese] economic behavior." Id.
320. Id.
321. Blaker, supra note 167 (explaining how LDP ruled Japan for 38 years of unin-
terrupted conservative rule).
322. Primer on Product Liability, supra note 297.
323. Id.; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90 (discussing how consumer groups his-
torically had little chance to work with LDP and saw their opportunity to push for PL
Law once LDP was out of power).
324. Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90. Because the LDP did not pay much atten-
tion to the concerns of Japan's consumer groups before it lost its power in 1993, con-
sumer groups were accustomed to working with the minority parties. Id. The con-
sumer groups therefore saw it as their golden opportunity to push for the passage of the
PL Law when the coalition government came to power. Id.
325. Hsu, supra note 2, at 65. There were 4639 consumer groups at the end of
1988. Id. Japan's consumer groups can be classified into five categories: consumer
cooperatives, advocacy groups, experts groups, and housewives organizations. Id.
326. Interview with Mr. Akira Ishida, General Manager for the Electric Home Ap-
pliance Products Liability Center, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 8, 1996) (discussing that be-
cause Japan's consumer groups worked together more than ever before in lobbying for
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encouraged Japanese politicians, who once could rely on satis-
fied and complacent voters, to become more sensitive to the
needs of their constituents. 3 27 Recent elections continue to indi-
cate that, although they are back in power, LDP leaders must
maintain a pro-consumer attitude to remain popular among vot-
ers. 3 2 8 The once pro-government, conservative LDP politicians
highlighted to their constituents during recent campaigns that
excessive regulation and an overbearing bureaucracy suffocate
Japan's economic growth.3 29 This pro-consumer platform runs
counter to the big business agenda the LDP championed for the
past fifty years.33
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PL LAW AND THE
PL LAW'S IMPACT ON JAPANESE SOCIETY
The major thrust of the PL Law is its introduction of strict
liability to Japanese society.3 3 1 Under strict liability theory, plain-
tiffs must only prove the existence of a product defect, and no
longer must prove fault, to find manufacturers liable.332 This
change is already impacting Japan's corporations, 3 judiciary, 34
legislature,335 and consumers.3 6
the passage of PL Law, PL Law is perhaps greatest legislative victory for Japan's con-
sumer groups.)
327. Id.
328. Id.; Upham, supra note 290, at 503-04 (describing rise and fall and rise again
of LDP); Sugiyama Interview, supra note 114 (mentioning LDP needed to attract new
voters so it reached out to consumer groups which once could only receive attention
from minority parties).
329. Deregulation in Japan, supra note 113, at E14.
330. Id.
331. See Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 16 (discussing that
introduction of strict liability is major substantive change of PL Law from old system).
332. See PL Law art. 3, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan) (discussing manufacturer's
unconditional liability for injuries resulting from its product's defects).
333. Masato Ishizawa, Product Law Means Having to Say, "I'm Sorry," NiKKEI WKLY.,
July 22, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Product Law Means] (explaining corporations' efforts to
produce safer products, improve warnings, settle claims more expediently, and
purchase product liability insurance as result of PL Law).
334. Matsushita Won't Appeal District Court Ruling, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9,
1994 [hereinafter Matsushita Won't Appeal] (discussing how PL Law influenced Osaka
judge to rule against manufacturer for first time on behalf of plaintiff's product liability
claim).
335. Taniguchi Interview, supra note 87 (discussing how recent Diet debate on
amendingJapan's Civil Code wasJapan's most animated and lively debate ever on civil
procedure partly because of PL Law's spurring of strong public interest in reforming
Japan's discovery law).
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A. Provisions of the PL Law
The PL Law contains six provisions.1 7 The PL Law is
shorter and less detailed than the EC Directive and the 1975
Draft. " 8 Observers believe that the PL Law's brevity will give the
courts latitude in interpreting the PL Law over the next several
years.339
1. PL Law's Definitions
The PL Law defines the key terms of product, defect, and
manufacturer.34 ° Product is defined as any movable property341
that is manufactured or processed. 42 The definition leaves the
exact parameters of what constitutes a product to interpretation
of the courts.3 4 3 Under contract and tort law, the Civil Code
does not define the term product. 44 Courts analyzed claims
brought under contract and tort law by focusing on the exist-
ence of manufacturer duty instead of questioning whether a par-
ticular good was a product.345 Claimants whose defected goods
do not constitute products will not be able to recover under the
PL Law.3 46
336. Product Complaints Double After Liability Law Start, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE,
Apr. 18, 1996 (discussing how consumer product liability claims to consumer centers
doubled after PL Law's start).
337. PL Law arts. 1-6, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan).
338. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 379-96 (comparing provisions of EC Directive,
1975 Draft, and PL Law).
339. Id. at 387. Commentators claim that the brevity of the statute "reflect[ts] the
inability of Japanese consumer and industry groups to reach a consensus on many sub-
stantive issues." Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 689.
340. PL Law arts. 2(1), 2(2), 2(3), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan).
341. PL Law art. 2(1), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). Movable is defined as "all
corporeal things, other than land and things firmly affixed to land." Behrens & Rad-
dock, supra note 18, at 7. Real estate, property, and services are not included. Id.
342. Mitsui, supra note 163, at 100. Processing is defined as "to use movables as
materials and add new value and/or nature to them." Id. A discussion in the Diet
made further attempts to define processing and it was agreed that any product that was
heated, grinded, or squeezed would be deemed to be processed whereas cutting, freez-
ing, refrigerating, and drying of a product would not be considered processed. Product
Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 16. This means sushi is covered but
sashimi is not. Id.
343. Id. The PL Law's definition of product is not as open-ended as the definition
of "product" laid out in the 1975 Draft which said a product is "anything which enters
the distribution process . . . " Marcuse, supra note 18, at 385.
344. MINPo, arts. 415, 570, 709.
345. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 384-86.
346. Id.
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The PL Law defines defect as the lack of safety a particular
product ordinarily should provide. 47 The PL Law's standard of
defect is similar to the consumer's expectation test 34 8 that most
U.S. jurisdictions use to define defect.3 49 Japanese courts are
able to employ notions of comparative negligence and foresee-
ability, and may apportion fault to plaintiffs who use a product in
an unforeseeable manner or who misuse a product.33 0 Japanese
courts adhered to the practice of apportioning fault before the
enactment of the PL Law and commentators argue that inclu-
sion of this practice in the new law may limit the practical scope
of strict liability. 5
The PL Law's definition of manufacturer breaks with the
past by including more potential types of defendants in its
347. PL Law art 2(2), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). "Defect" means "lack of safety
that the product ordinarily should provide, taking into account the nature of the prod-
uct, the ordinarily foreseeable use of the product, the time when the manufacturer, etc.
delivered the product, and other circumstances concerning the product." Id. The PL
Law's broad definition of "defect" surprised observers who were expecting lawmakers to
enact a more specific standard in light of the flood of litigation in the United States
over how to interpret "defect." Interview with Mr. Phillip Quaranta, Jr., attorney with
the Law Firm of Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman, & Dicker (Tokyo), in Tokyo, Japan
(Aug. 17, 1996);Jon Choy, Reform Movement Reaches Legal Arena, JEI REPORT, Apr. 1994.
348. DAVID G. OWEN ET. AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFEY: CASES AND MATERIALS
192 (3d. ed. 1996).
Many courts [in the United States] have used consumer expectations as a cri-
teria for defining defect. If a consumer reasonably expects a product to be
safe to use for a purpose, the product is defective if it does not meet those
expectations. The consumer expectations test is natural since strict liability in
tort developed from the law of warranty. The law of implied warranty is vitally
concerned with protecting justified expectations since this is a fundamental
policy of the law of contracts.
Fisher, Products Liability: The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 339, 348 (1974). In the
United States, an alternative to the consumer expectations test is the risk-utility test.
OWEN, supra note 348, at 202-15. A product is considered defective under a risk-utility
test if the costs of improving its safety are less than the benefits resulting from the
improvement. Id. In applying the risk-utility test, many courts look at some or all of the
following factors: the usefulness and desirability of the product; the safety aspects of the
product; the availability of a substitute product; the manufacturer's ability to eliminate
the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness; the user's ability to
avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; the user's anticipated
awareness of the dangers inherent in the product; and the feasibility, on the part of the
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liabil-
ity insurance. Id. at 212.
349. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 696-97.
350. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 386.
351. Id.
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scope. 52 Under the PL Law, injured consumers may bring a suit
against any party involved in the manufacturing process, such as
component manufacturers, processors, or importers.353 Con-
sumers' ability to bring suit against retailers and distributors,
however, does not extend beyond those sellers who affix their
name or trademark on products they sell or who import goods
directly from abroad.354
2. Strict Liability
The PL Law's notion of strict liability holds manufacturers
or producers liable, regardless of fault, for injuries that their de-
fective products cause.355 This rule applies to any action involv-
ing a product that left the manufacturer's control after July 1,
1995.356 Some observers argue that although plaintiffs are no
longer required to prove fault, plaintiffs' burden of proof will
still be difficult to meet because of the PL Law's failure to in-
clude a special discovery procedure for product liability suits.357
Lawyers and consumers, moreover, had hoped the PL Law
would have included an automatic presumption of liability for
situations where a causal relationship between a defect and in-
jury is obvious. 358 Although lawmakers did not include auto-
352. Id. at 386-87. The PL Law defines manufacturer as one of the following:
(1) any person who manufactured, processed, or imported the product as
business; (2) any person who, by putting his name, trade name, trade mark or
other feature on the product presents himself as its manufacturer, or any per-
son who puts the representation of name, etc. on the product in a manner
mistakable for the manufacturer; (3) apart from any person mentioned in the
preceding subsections, any person who, by putting their representation of
name, etc. on the product, may be recognized as its manufacturer-in-fact, in
the light of a manner concerning manufacturing, processing, importation or
sales, and other circumstances.
PL Law art. 2(3), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan).
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. art. 3.
The manufacturer, etc. shall be liable for damages caused by the injury,
when he injured someone's life, body, or property by the defect in his deliv-
ered product which he manufactured, processed, imported or put the repre-
sentation of name, etc. as described in subsection 2 or 3 of section 3 of Article
2. However, the manufacturer, etc. is not liable when only the defective prod-
uct itself is damaged.
Id.
356. Id.
357. Choy, supra note 347; Marcuse, supra note 18, at 388-90.
358. Choy, supra note 347.
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matic presumption of liability, the PL Law is vague on this point
which gives judges latitude to lower the causation burden.159 Ju-
dicial interpretation will be important for further clarification.36 °
3. Defenses
The PL Law provides two manufacturer defenses. 36' The
1975 Draft did not include these defenses, and before the PL
Law, courts used discretion in applying them.3 6 2 The first de-
fense exempts component manufacturers from liability if the de-
fect is due to the fault of the manufacturer of the product as a
whole. 363 The second defense exempts manufacturers from lia-
bility if manufacturers are unable to detect a defect given the
state of the art364 at the time of the product's delivery. 36" By ex-
plicitly including these defenses in the PL Law, the law restricts
the courts' judicial discretion to not apply the defenses.3 6 6
4. Time Limitations
The PL Law addresses time limits for filing product liability
suits and provides two specific statutes of limitation. 67 The first
359. Interview with Mr. Atsushi Yamashita, Attorney, Law Office of Tanaka & Taka-
hasi, in Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 11, 1996).
360. Id.
361. PL Law art. 4(1), 4(2), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). In cases where Article 3
applies, the manufacturer, etc. shall not be liable as a result of Article 3 if he proves:
(1) that the state of scientific or technical knowledge at the time when the
manufacturer, etc. delivered the product was not such as to enable the exist-
ence of the defect in the product to be discovered, or (2) in the case where
the product is used as a component or raw material of another product, that
the defect is substantially attributable to compliance with the instruction con-
cerning the specifications given by the manufacturer of the said another prod-
uct, and that the manufacturer, etc. is not negligent on occurrence of the
defect.
Id.
362. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 392-93.
363. PL Law art. 4(1), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan).
364. Thomas Leo Madden, An Explanation of Japan's Product Liability Law, 5 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 229, 320 (defining state of the art as "the risk of being unable,
through the level of scientific and technical knowledge at the time [a] product is placed
into distribution, to detect any inherent defect which may exist in such product").
365. Id. art. 4(2).
366. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 392-93.
367. PL Law art. 5(1), 5(2), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). Time limitations in the
PL Law for bringing claims are explained as follows:
(1) The right for damages provided in Article 3 shall be extinguished by
prescription if the injured person or his legal representative does not exercise
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limit requires a plaintiff to file suit within three years from when
the plaintiff first discovered the defect.36 The second statute of
limitation restricts plaintiffs from bringing a cause of action
more than ten years after the plaintiff received the product.369
The PL Law defers the beginning of the ten year statute of limi-
tations for toxic harms. 7 °
5. Application of the Civil Code
The PL Law allows judges to use contract and tort provi-
sions of the Civil Code where the PL Law is silent on an issue. 71
Critics argue this provision of the PL Law is a major blow to the
effectiveness of the PL Law because it partially reinforces the sta-
tus quo. 72 For example, judges must award damages in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Civil Code because the PL Law
does not address the topic of damages.373 Further, the statute
failed to make mention of the relationship between the judiciary
and ADR system.3 74 Critics argue that this shortcoming fails to
grant the courts power to review or influence ADR mechanisms
and could provide for the development of disparaging standards
between ADR and judicial results.37 5
such right within 3 years from the time when he becomes aware of the damage
and the liable party for the damage. The same shall also apply upon the ex-
piry of a period of 10 years from the time when the manufacturer, etc. deliv-
ered the product; (2) The period in the latter sentence of section 1 of this
Article shall be calculated from the time when the damage arises, where such
damage is caused by the substances which are harmful to human health when
they remain or accumulate in the body, or where the symptoms for such dam-
age appear after a certain latent period.
Id.
368. Id. art. 5(1).
369. Id. art. 5(1), 5(2).
370. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 393-95.
371. PL Law art. 6, Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). Article 6 provides: "In so far as
this law does not provide otherwise, the liability of the manufacture, etc. for damages
caused by a defect in the product shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code."
Id.
372. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 394-95.
373. Id. at 396.
374. Id. at 397.
375. Nakamura Interview, supra note 114 (discussing that disparaging standards
between ADR decisions and court opinions reduce role of law and allow ADR to exist
outside purview of established legal standards).
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B. The PL Law's Impact
In the short time since its enactment, the PL Law has
changed Japan in many ways. 76 Corporate Japan has a new atti-
tude toward product safety and consumer claims.177 The Japa-
nese judiciary is showing signs of a new bias toward consum-
ers,378 and the Diet is reforming laws on discovery and freedom
of information. 79 Consumer interest in the PL Law has created
a new public debate on consumer rights, 8 ° and holders of defec-
tive products are more willingly coming forward with their
claims.381
376. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1, 4 (describing dramatic change in
corporate attitude toward settling consumer claims and respecting consumer rights af-
ter enactment of PL Law); Shichi, Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at
17 (explaining how PL Law created new ADR mechanisms and PL Law is changing
business relationships between retailers and distributors through enforcement of new
contracts); PL Ho Hoko Kara Ichi Nen, Sosho Wa Zero Da Ga - Minpo No Fuho Ko De
Sekinin 0 Tomonau Sosho Ga Kyuzochu [One Year After PL's Enactment: No Strict Product
Liability Cases Decided But Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility in Settlements], NIKEI
VENTURE, July 1996, at 10 [hereinafter Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility] (discuss-
ing how manufacturers are more readily assuming liability for product defects due to
influence of PL Law and consumers are bringing more suits); Masato Nakamura,
Seizobutsu Sekinin Ho Shiko Ichi Nen to Sono Jitai [The Situation One Year After PL Law's
Enactment], ATARASHn BUSINESS LAW NO SENMONZASHI (NBL), July. 1, 1996, at 23-27
[hereinafter The Situation) (discussing increase in product liability insurance sales and
increase in power of consumers in consulting with manufacturers); PL Ho Shiko Kara
Ichi Nen fiko Boshi no Tame ni Doo Kawata Ka [How Has Safety Prevention Changed One Year
After PL Law Began?], TASHIKA NA Hi, July 1996, at 18-22 [hereinafter Safety Prevention
Changed] (discussing increase in consumer consciousness of product safety and PL
Law).
377. PL Ho no Ichi Nen o Kensho Suru [Reviewing the First Year of the PL Law], SHUPAN
ToYo KFIzAI, June 29, 1996 (discussing corporations' creation of new systems for claim
settlements, product safety, and recalls).
378. Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility, supra note 378, at 10 (explaining how
Osaka judge behaved unusually pro-consumer by awarding damages to single-injury
plaintiff in suit against Matsushita Electric where negligence and causation was assumed
by court).
379. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 18 (discussing Diet's
amendment to Japan's discovery rule to require greater production of documents dur-
ing discovery).
380. Ishida Interview, supra note 326 (discussing active role consumer groups have
taken to use PL Law as vehicle for educating consumers about consumer rights).
381. Reviewing The First Year of the PL Law, supra note 377, at 148 (explaining that
consumer claims to consumer centers doubled in the first year after PL Law began);
Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility, supra note 376, at 10 (discussing increase in
plaintiff product liability suits under negligence regime because only products deliv-
ered afterJuly 1, 1995 can be included in suit under the PL Law); Kazuo Takita, Japan
Non-Life Sector in P&L Policy Sales Drive, INSURANCE DAY, June 27, 1996, at 3 (stating "the
number of complaints about products and services is beginning to soar.").
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1. The Effect on Corporate Japan
Japanese manufacturers are increasing capital investments
to educate themselves on the PL Law and restructure their busi-
nesses to improve the safety and quality of their products.382
Specifically, manufacturers are responding faster to claims, 38 3 in-
creasing their purchases of product liability insurance cover-
age,384 and revising product warnings and instructions. 85 Japa-
nese manufacturers are also focusing on the safety of their prod-
ucts more than they had in the past.3 86 Manufacturers and
retailers, moreover, are placing more significance on the negoti-
ation and drafting of contracts to apportion potential liability
between themselves. 87
a. Manufacturers Increase Settlements with Consumers
The PL Law has triggered a new corporate attitude in re-
sponding to consumer product liability claims. 388 Before the en-
actment of the PL Law, manufacturers often ignored claims and
blamed consumer misuse for the cause of product defects. 89
Consumers, at that time, rarely had any other option but to ac-
cept such a response and suffer the consequences.39 ° Now,
aware that consumers need only prove the existence of a prod-
382. Toshiba PL Shanai Kansasei: Setsubi, Seizoku Kara Hanbai Ko Made [ Toshiba Imple-
ments PL System: From Manufacturing to Sales], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, July 3, 1996 (ex-
plaining how Toshiba corporation created product liability system which includes new
department staffed with safety specialists and special consumer consultation center).
383. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1.
384. Takita, supra note 381, at 3. A spokesperson for Tokio Marine & Fire Insur-
ance, Co., Japan's largest non-life insurer, said its sales of product liability insurance
doubled over the course of the first year after the PL Law was enacted. Id. Mitsui
Marine & Fire Insurance, Co. also reported a sharp increase in insurance sales and
disclosed that its product liability claims doubled since the law went into effect. Id.
385. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1; Firms on the Defensive, supra note 16, at
1.
386. Product Liability Law Forcing Toy Makers to Make Changes, DAILY YOMIURi, Aug.
23, 1995; Andrew Pollack, Japan Learns to Love Safety, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1996, at D1
[hereinafter Japan Learns to Love Safety].
387. PL Law Sure to Change Business Relationships, DAILy YoMiumu, Aug. 25, 1997 at
17 [hereinafter Change Business Relationships].
388. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1; Ishida Interview, supra note 326.
389. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1.
390. Id.; See Nakamura Interview, supra note 114 (discussing that before PL Law
consumers had little leverage in their negotiations with manufacturers and were often




uct defect to win in court, corporations are quickly acknowledg-
ing their defects and settling claims with consumers.39
Several recent settlements illustrate the change in the atti-
tude of manufacturers in regard to settling product liability
cases.3 92 For example, before the PL Law's enactment, an auto-
matic door manufacturer refused to compensate a claimant who
suffered injuries when one of the manufacturer's doors closed
on the claimant.393 The manufacturer blamed the claimant for
not moving through the doorway fast enough, and the claimant
lost his case.394 After the PL Law's enactment, however, another
plaintiff, who suffered similar injuries from an automatic door
manufactured by the same company, received a settlement of
US$30,000 from the manufacturer. 95 In the second case, which
had almost identical facts to the first case, the manufacturer ac-
knowledged that a defect existed and admitted that the door was
not designed to close while someone stood in the doorway.3 9 6 In
the second case, the manufacturer considered strict liability the-
ory and determined that the claimant should recover because
she would be able to prove the existence of the defect and win
the case under the PL Law if the case went to court.39 7
In another case, a plaintiff sued a manufacturer of baby
cribs because of an alleged design defect which caused the suffo-
cation of his baby.398 The case ensued for more than nine and a
half years because of the plaintiffs difficulty in proving the man-
ufacturer's negligence.39 9 Once the PL Law passed, however,
the manufacturer quickly settled with the plaintiffs and admitted
391. Id.; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90 (arguing consumers now have bargain-
ing power against manufacturers because manufacturers do not want to go to court and
cause damage to their reputation in media). The PL Law is being used by attorneys and
mediators in settlement discussions. Id. Manufacturers are now examining claims
under strict liability regardless of whether claims will wind up in court. Id.
392. See Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility, supra note 376, at 10 (discussing
that manufacturers are now settling claims they would have once dismissed because of
lower burden of proof required by consumers under PL Law); PL Ho Ichi Nen, Takamaru
Ishiki [Consciousness Toward PL Law Rises After One Year], AsA-n SHIMBUN, July 1, 1997
[hereinafter Consciousness Toward PL Law] (discussing that manufacturers now want to
settle all product liability-related problems as quickly as possible).





398. The Situation, supra note 376, at 26.
399. Id.
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the existence of the defect.40 ° Other claims that settled in favor
of consumers, which before the PL Law observers claim typically
would have been dismissed by manufacturers, included acci-
dents where electronic goods, such as televisions and ceramic
heaters, allegedly caused fires.40 ' Even though most of the evi-
dence was destroyed in the fires, the manufacturers settled with
the consumers in these cases because of fear that the consumers
would win their claims under the PL Law.40 2
b. Corporations Create New Dispute Resolution Facilities
To handle product liability claims more efficiently, individ-
ual companies and industry groups created dispute resolution
systems in response to the PL Law.40 3 Approximately eighty per-
cent of 1320 major manufacturers recently surveyed established
departments to handle product liability claims. 40 4 At the indus-
trial level, fifteen industries, including automobile, cosmetic,
drug, toy, and home-appliance industries, pooled resources and
established new product liability centers to mediate and arbitrate
consumer claims.40 5
When consumers bring claims to these centers, the centers
conduct their own investigations by examining the defective
products and interviewing witnesses.40 6 When the centers de-
clare products defective, the centers are supposed to negotiate
with manufacturers on behalf of consumers.40 7 If a consumer is
dissatisfied with the results of a negotiation, the consumer may
choose to have the center's arbitration panel408 rule on the
400. Id. Even though this incident occurred many years before the PL Law be-
came effective and was litigated under negligence theory, the manufacturer wanted to
take no chances that a court would apply strict liability theory. Consciousness Toward PL
Law, supra note 392. Thus, manufacturers are even eager to settle cases that technically
do not fall under the scope of the PL Law. Id.




405. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1. MITI requested each industry to set
up a center to deal with product liability claims. Product Liability Centers to Handle Con-
sumer Cases, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 12, 1995 [hereafter Product Liability Centers].
406. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
407. Id.
408. Id. The arbitration panel would consist of a legal expert (such as a lawyer or
judge), a consumer specialist and other experts. Id. In the first year following the law's
enactment, no cases, at any of the fifteen industry centers, had reached the arbitration
1997]
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case.419 If the arbitration panel's solution is still unsatisfactory to
the consumer, the center may help the consumer pursue litiga-
tion. 4 10 The centers process consumer claims at little or no cost
and provide free discovery which may later be used in court.4 11
Critics argue that the centers, largely funded by manufactur-
ers, do not adequately represent consumer interests.4 1 2 Critics
also emphasize that the centers must take a more active role in
disseminating information about product defects and resist the
temptation to conceal evidence in an effort to protect the repu-
tation of manufacturers.41 3 If manufacturers and consumers
continue to settle claims between themselves and refrain from
disclosing product defect information to the public, critics argue
that Japan's product liability system will not continue to de-
velop.4 14
c. Companies' New Emphasis on Warnings and Instructions
Under the PL Law, manufacturers are held strictly liable for
stage. Ishida Interview, supra note 326. Most consumer calls were mere inquiries and
several were actual accidents that resulted in negotiations. Id.
409. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. PL Ho Shiko Ichi Nen: Sofu Shori Kikai, Wakai Wa Tsutsuki [One Year After PL
Law's Enactment: ADR Mechanisms On the Rise], NIKKEI SHIMBUN,June 21, 1996 [hereinaf-
ter ADR Mechanisms on the Rise] (explaining that most product liability centers are al-
lowing manufacturers to deal directly with consumers without intervention by neutral
third parties which may hinder bargaining power of consumers). "To win trust from
both consumers and manufacturers, an organization set up by an industry should prac-
tice transparency in the process of conciliation and mediation and assure a neutral
position." Product Liability Centers, supra note 405.
413. ADR Mechanisms on the Rise, supra note 412. In a recent situation where sev-
eral young children swallowed Japanese konyakujelly and choked to death, critics argue
that the product liability centers did not disclose warnings about the product soon
enough. Isoyama Tomoyuki, PL Ho Ichinen: Hanran Suru Keikoku, Anzen Taisaku Ni Ki-
gyo Sa [Differences Among Industries in Warning and Product Safety Procedures], NIKKEI BusI-
NESS, June 24, 1996, at 115-16.
414. Joho no Kokai ga PL Ho o Ikasu [PL Law Depends on Disclosure of Information,
HcE AIDO SHIMBUN, July 7, 1996 (arguing that PL Law will not be successful if manufac-
turers do not take responsibility to inform public of product defects); Shohisha mo Koe-
age Joho Kokai [Consumers Are Demanding More Disclosure], June 27, 1995 (discussing that
PL Law sparked debate among consumers on the need for more information from
manufacturers); SeihinJikojoho Kokai wa Fujubun [Disclosure of Product Defect Information is
Inadequate], NIKKEI SHIMBUN, June 23, 1996 (discussing that when MITI attempted to
compile data from manufacturers on product defect claims reported to manufacturers
within first year of PL Law's enactment, less than three percent of manufacturers re-
sponded).
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selling products without sufficient warnings and instructions.41
As a result, manufacturers are emphasizing improved quality in
this area by clarifying their instructions and warnings.416 For ex-
ample, in response to a series of incidents involving young chil-
dren who choked to death on konyaku jelly,41 7 manufacturers
quickly added a warning to the product's label advising parents
to cut the jelly into smaller pieces before giving it to their chil-
dren.41 8
Before the PL Law, Japanese warnings were often vague and
only slightly cautionary.41 9 Japanese manufacturers argued in
the past that strong language on warning labels would insultJap-
anese consumers.420  For products being exported to foreign
markets, however, Japanese manufactures often included spe-
cific warnings and instructions to match the standards of the
415. See Firms on the Defensive, supra note 16, at 10 (indicating that becafise warn-
ings and handling instructions are considered part of products, manufacturers are lia-
ble under PL Law for selling defective products if warnings or instructions are inade-
quate).
416. Makers of Pharmaceuticals Taking Steps to Prevent Improper Use of Medication, DAILY
YoMIum, Aug. 24, 1995, at 13. companies were said to have sold the antiviral drug
Sorivudine without clear instructions on usage when it first was sold. Id. Sixteen peo-
ple died from using the drug incorrectly. Id. In light of preventing similar situations
from occurring in the future, pharmaceutical companies have recently been adding
illustrations to their instructions to clarify proper usage. Id.
417. Konyaku Hairi Jeri no Jiko: Keikoku Hyoji no Kisai o Yobo [The Konyaku Jelly Inci-
dent - Protection Through Warning Labels], NIHON KrIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 20, 1996
(describing konyaku jelly as 'Japanese Jello"). The jelly is sold in separately wrapped
mouth-size portions which adults can eat whole but children have difficulty swallowing.
Id.
418. Konyaku Jeri no Chuikaki ga Fujubun [ Konyaku Jelly's Warning Labels Are Inade-
quate, KOBE SHIMBUN, Apr. 30, 1996, at 3 (noting that warnings on konyakujelly did not
originally state that konyakujelly could easily get stuck in children's throats).
419. Id.; Product Liability Law Should Be Viewed as Challenge, Not Threat, NIKKEI WKLY.,
July 24, 1995, at 6 (clarifying that before enactment of PL Law.Japanese manufacturers
did not sufficiently consider package information and warnings).
420. Ishida Interview, supra note 326. An example of howJapanese and non-Japa-
nese manufacturers warned their customers differently involves warnings and instruc-
tions for the use of a hairdryer. Firms on the Defensive, supra note 16, at 10. AJapanese
hairdryer had the warning "Never use this product inside the bath or with wet hands
due to danger of electric shock." Id. Meanwhile, a non-Japanese-made hairdryer
stressed a list of several precautions consumers should follow when using the hairdryer
and listed particular dangers the consumers should avoid. Id. The non-Japanese-made
hairdryer, for example, specifically stated that if the hairdryer falls into water, the plug
should be removed from the socket and the consumer's hands should be kept out of
the water. Id. The wording on the non-Japanese hairdryer was said to leave nothing to
the consumer's imagination. Id.
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market abroad.42'
Japanese companies are now aggressively studying how to
improve their warning labels for Japanese consumers.422 Many
companies have hired experts to assist them with changing their
warnings.423 Manufacturers are concerned, however, because
there is little precedent in Japan to determine what level of warn-
ing is sufficient to protect manufacturers from liability.424 Critics
argue, moreover, that few Japanese consumers understand or
pay attention to new warnings and that Japanese manufacturers
may actually confuse consumers more by including too many
warnings on packages.42 5
d. New Corporate Focus: Product Safety.
Manufacturers are reducing product liability exposure by
creating safer products and recalling potentially dangerous
products. 426 Since the PL Law's enactment, manufacturers have
been greatly increasing their product recalls and have been
more widely announcing their recall campaigns.42 v Moreover, at
the suggestions of new in-house safety consultants and industry-
wide experts, manufacturers are making their products more re-
silient to product liability suits by redesigning and discontinuing
421. Noriko Yamaguchi, Pressure Builds for Japanese Product Liability Law, REuTERs
Bus. REP., Apr. 21, 1993. As an example of disparate warning procedures taken by
Japanese manufacturers for their products sold abroad, Nintendo's labels on video
games sold in the United States included the dangers of having epileptic fits from play-
ing the video games but included no such warning for the domestically-sold video
games. Id. At that time, Nintendo's reason for using two different warnings for the
same product was "Consumer interest differs in the two countries. We don't have a
product liability law here in Japan." Id.
422. Makers of Pharmaceutical Taking Steps to Prevent Improper Use of Medication, supra
note 416, at 13. The PL Law is prodding Japanese manufactures to "take steps to pre-
vent consumers from incorrectly using their products." Id.
423. Tomoyuki, supra note 413, at 111-13.
424. Id. (explaining that inconsistency and lack of clarity among Japanese warn-
ings impedes manufacturers' efforts to determine standard of care).
425. How Has Safety Prevention Changed One Year After Law Began?, supra note 376, at
21-22 (indicating results of November 1995 survey in which consumers' knowledge and
understanding of warning labels was tested).
426. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 4.
427. See Auto News: Mitsubishi Recall, EDMONTON JOURNAL, July 30, 1996 (discussing
that risk of lawsuits under PL Law encouraged Mitsubishi Motors Corp. to recall
635,000 vehicles as part of its largest-ever recall); Kyujitsu Henjo De, Seihin Kaishyu - CD
ni Wuirusu [Recall of CD ROMs Infected with Computer Virus], KOBE SHIMBUN, July 4, 1996
(discussing computer maker's decision to recall its virus-infected CD ROMs because of
fear that computer viruses could be identified as defects under PL Law).
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certain products.4 21
Companies in the food4 29 and clothing 4 0 industries have
made changes in their production lines to ensure safe manufac-
turing.4"1 In a more dramatic response to the PL Law, Japan's
two major manufacturers 43 2 of silicone decided to withdraw from
the Japanese market.433 Both manufacturers cited the PL Law as
a reason for quitting their production of silicone and expressed
concern over potential law suits. 4 34 Toy manufacturers, more-
over, are struggling, under the PL Law, to create safer products
that continue to appeal to children. 5
The automobile industry is also reacting to the PL Law by
launching major advertising and marketing campaigns that aim
to sell safety.4 36 Compared to their counterparts in the United
States and Europe, Japanese automakers in the past focused
more on fuel economy, car style, and low prices than on
safety.43 7 Now, however, Japanese automakers are attempting to
428. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1.
429. Id. Since the law was passed, sales of sterilization machines, used in food
processing, have increased twenty percent, thus indicating a concern among food man-
ufacturers that lawsuits could result from contaminated food products. Id. Ishida Co.,
a Kyoto-based maker of the sterilization machines sold approximately 2000 machines to
detect metal in food over the past year. Id. "Our business has dramatically changed
since April 1995 because of the product liability law," said a manager of Ishida. Id.
430. Id. Clothing manufacturers have been buying new equipment to detect need-
les in their products. Id. In Aomori Prefecture, a major clothing manufacturer bought
three needle-detecting machines during the past year and hired three workers to oper-
ate them. Id.
431. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 4.
432. Nori Kageki, Product Liability Law Scares Silicone Firms Out of the Market, NiKKEi
WEEKLY, Aug. 28, 1995, at 9. Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. and Toshiba Silicone Co. are the
two manufacturers that withdrew from the Japanese market. Id.
433. Id. Even though the two pharmaceutical companies manufactured silicone
for coating hypodermic needles, and not breast implants, the companies feared the
possibility of future problems in the needle silicone industry. Id. Their fear exists de-
spite the fact that there has been no problem since silicone began being used in need-
les over twenty years ago. Id.
434. Id.
435. Product Liability Law Forcing Toy Makers to Make Changes, supra note 386. New
safety measures at one toy company included treating dolls with a sour material to dis-
courage children from putting it into their mouths. Id. Bandai Corporation, a major
Japanese toy manufacturer, spent 500 million yen preparing for the new law. Id. An
example of one of Bandai's changes is its decision to increase the size of a handbag on
one of its popular dolls to prevent young girls from swallowing the handbags. Anzensei
wa Kakujitsu ni Kojo [Increasing Safety Checks], KYoTo SHIMBU, June 16, 1996.
436. Japan Learns to Love Safety, supra note 386, at DI.
437. Id.
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increase their competitiveness by building more accident-proof
automobiles. s
e. Increase in Purchases of Product Liability Insurance
Japanese manufacturers are preparing for potential product
liability claims by substantially increasing their insurance cover-
age.139 Although private product liability insurance has been in
existence in Japan for more than thirty-eight years, few compa-
nies purchased policies until the PL Law went into effect.4 4 ° Jap-
anese insurance companies began creating corporate interest in
the PL Law by conducting nation-wide seminars on the reform
of the product liability system as early as a few years before the
law's enactment.441 In addition to selling insurance, Japan's ma-
jor insurance companies are offering expansive consulting serv-
ices to help clients prevent product liability claims.4 4 2 Because
product liability insurance premiums are fixed at rates too ex-
pensive for most small and midsize corporations, the Japanese
government created a special insurance pool to enable small and
midsize companies to buy product liability insurance at approxi-
mately half the cost of ordinary policies.4 4
438. Id.
439. See Nonlife Insurers Enjoy Boom After PL Law, DAILYVYOMIUR, Aug. 26, 1995, at 9
[hereinafter Insurers Enjoy Boom] (explaining that between July and August of 1995,
share ofJapanese companies with policies increased from two percent to ten percent).
Id. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance Co., one of Japan's leading nonlife insurance
companies, sold 14,000 product liability insurance policies between April and June of
1995. Id. In all of fiscal year 1994, Sumitomo sold 12,000 contracts. New Law Spurs
Sales of Product Liability Insurance: Consumer Protection Measure Puts Firms on Unchartered
Ground, NiKKEi WKLY., Aug. 28, 1995, at 16.
440. Insurers Enjoy Boom, supra note 439, at 9.
441. Insurance Firms Look to Consulting on Product Liability, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEw-
SWIRE, Oct. 11, 1993 [hereinafter Consulting on Product Liability] (stating "by consulting
clients on the prevention of product liability disputes and by strengthening connections
in this area.., insurance companies are hoping that such efforts will lead to expanding
their business opportunities.).
442. Id. Most major insurance companies provide free services to assess how well a
company is prepared to prevent potential product liability problems. Id.
443. Hiroyuki Nishimura, Product-liability Premiums Slashed, NiKKEi WEEKLY, Feb. 27,
1995, at 20. Under this special insurance pool, three major business organizations, The
Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Central Federation of Societies of
Commerce and Industry, and the National Federation of Small Business Associations,
contract for product liability coverage as a group and promote it to small companies at
a discount. Id. These organizations created the insurance pool because analysts pre-
dicted small and midsize companies would be impacted most by the PL Law. Mihoko
lida, Product-Liability Law Approaching Birth; Impact Projected to be Roughest on Nation's Small
and Midsize Companies, NIKKcEi WKLY., Oct. 25, 1993, at 3. According to a MITI report,
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Consultants are warning manufacturers to enact a total
safety system and not rely solely on their insurance policies444
because the insurance does not protect against all potential
claims.44 5 One limitation of a standard product liability insur-
ance policy is that manufacturers must recall or exchange defec-
tive products in order to be eligible for insurance benefits.4 4 6
Insurance policies do not, however, cover expenses related to
product recalls.447 Moreover, insurance policies limit indemnifi-
cation amounts and, in cases of gross negligence, provide no in-
demnification.448 Product liability insurance also fails to cover
exported goods.449 Exporters must, therefore, purchase a sepa-
rate policy to cover products sold abroad.45 °
f. Increase in Use of Contracts to Structure Business
Relationships
Distinguishable from practices in the United States, Japa-
nese business relationships have tended to be based more on
mutual trust and familiarity4"1 than on specific rights and obliga-
tions set forth by contracts.4 52 The PL Law, however, is weaken-
more than ninety-nine percent of Japanese manufacturers are small or midsize. Id.
One reason why small and midsize companies may be affected greatly by the PL Law is
that defective products are often the result of a fault in a product's parts and most part
manufacturers are small or midsize companies. Id. Food manufacturers, the majority
of which are small and midsize, are believed to be particularly vulnerable to potential
suits under the law. Id. Overall,Japan has approximately five million small and midsize
corporations which have fewer resources to cope with the PL Law than large compa-
nies. Id.
444. Masako Fukuda, New Law Spurs Sales of Product-Liability Insurance, NIKKEI
WEEKLY, Aug. 28, 1995, at 16 (demonstrating that companies need to enact safety-con-
trol system to avoid defective products in addition to purchasing liability insurance);
Product Liability Law Should Be Viewed as Challenge, Not Threat, supra note 419, at 6
(stressing companies must do more to prevent law suits than buy insurance).
445. Insurers Enjoy Boom, supra note 439, at 9 (claiming product liability insurance
favors consumers and not policy holders).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Product Liability Law Should Be Viewed As A Challenge, Not Threat, supra note 419,
at 6.
449. Insurers Enjoy Boom, supra note 439, at 9.
450. Id.
451. CurtisJ. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory ofJapanese Corporate Governance: Contract,
Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 3, 5 (1996). Japanese business relation-
ships are based primarily on familiarity and trust. Id. MostJapanese business partners
view the law as unimportant in enforcing the scope of their relationships. Id.
452. Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW IN
JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 1-21 (1974) [hereinafter Contract in Japan] (explaining Japanese
1997]
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ing the trust between Japanese retailers and manufacturers, and
between retailers and consumers, as they all begin to wrestle with
apportioning liability for product defects.4 5 3 To delineate clear
lines of liability, Japanese retailers are starting to use detailed
contracts in their dealings with manufacturers and consumers.4 54
preference for engaging in long-standing business relationships that exist unrestricted
by specific contract provisions). The concept was flushed out by Professor Hattori
Shiro, a linguistics professor at Tokyo University, when he stated:
Americans carefully observe the law, regulations and contractual agree-
ments, and they make full use of these legal forms. Japanese do not have a
sufficiently clear conception of such legal forms but honor and trust jojo, the
surrounding circumstances; giri, moral or social obligation to others; ninjo,
human feeling; yujo, friendship; [and] magokoro, sincerity .... It is perhaps
well-known that Americans observe contractual obligations more closely than
Japanese. An American will say that he is not responsible for what he did not
agree to. When a Japanese makes an agreement with another person, the
goodwill and friendship that gave rise to the agreement is more important to
him than the agreement itself. If there is sincerity, it does not matter if the
contract itself is not executed exactly according to its terms. To Americans,
legal agreements and feelings of friendship are completely different things. In
these circumstances, Japanese tend to be preoccupied with a friendly atmos-
phere and are not careful to see that the agreement itself is thorough.
ASAHI SHIMBUN, December 20, 1952 at 6 (quoted in Contract in Japan, supra, at 6-7). "In
Japan, not only are there many instances where written agreements are not drafted, but
even when written agreements are drafted, their contents are generally very simple."
Contract in Japan, supra, at 15. In contrast, Western contracts tend to set forth the
rights and duties of business partners in detail and provide for all possible contingen-
cies. Id.
453. Reviewing the First Year of the PL Law, supra note 377, at 150-51.
454. Change Business Relationships, supra note 387, at 17 (explaining that before PL
Law contracts between manufacturers and retailers did not deal with apportionment of
liability for product defect claims); Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at
17 (describing how PL Law triggered retailers and distributors to focus on amending
contracts with manufacturers). For example, Daiei Inc., a major Japanese retailer is
considering amending its contracts to deal more specifically with assigning responsibil-
ity for product liability. Change Business Relationships, supra note 387, at 17. Isetan De-
partment Store is delineating the allotment of product liability responsibility in its con-
tracts with new business partners. Id. This trend in apportioning liability runs counter
to the traditional notion that Japanese are not inclined to use precisely written con-
tracts with contingency provisions for potential disputes. Eiichi Hoshino &John Haley,
The Contemporary Contract, 5 LAw INJAPAN 1, 44 (1972). It was believed thatJapanese did
not enter into human relationships anticipating the outbreak of a dispute and did not
want the courts to resolve a dispute, should it occur, based on law. Id. Therefore, most
Japanese contracts have not spelled out the rights and obligations of the parties should
a dispute occur. Contract in Japan, supra note 452, at 17. Instead of specific allocations
of risk, most Japanese contracts have traditionally included general phrases requiring
parties to settle any disputes harmoniously and in good faith. Id. Moreover, in the past,
Japanese have seen no use in negotiating specific liability provisions because it has
been the general practice of Japanese businesses that any provisions that are included
in a written agreement are tentative rather than definite. Id.
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Under the PL Law, retailers and distributors are excluded
from liability unless they affix their own brand names to prod-
ucts or import products directly from abroad.4 5 Nonetheless,
many retailers and distributors, whose businesses are outside the
scope of the PL Law, are requiring manufacturers to enter into
contracts and assume liability for product defect claims.4 56
Observers claim the situation has become coercive where
large retailers, who sell house-brands or direct imports and thus
would be held liable under the PL Law, are using their dominant
market position to require small manufacturers to assume liabil-
ity for product defect claims. 457 Some retailers are also request-
ing manufacturers to allow the retailers to directly negotiate
claim settlements with customers on behalf of the manufactur-
ers.4 5  In such situations, the manufacturers would be required
to pay any settlement amount the retailers promised to the in-
jured customers.459 Some retailers are refusing to do business
with manufacturers that have not purchased product liability in-
surance.
4 60
Small manufacturers often lack the in-house legal depart-
ments that large retailers have46' and, without access to legal ex-
pertise, are being coerced into contracts of adhesion.462 The sit-
uation has become problematic enough for the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission463 to approach the retailers and distributors
that are imposing unreasonable amendments on manufacturers
and warn them of the possibility of being penalized for violating
455. PL Law art. 2(3), Law No. 85 of 1994 (Japan). Because of changes in the
Japanese economy and a new demand for less expensive goods, more retailers are sell-
ing house brands and importing goods directly from abroad. Change Business Relation-
ships, supra note 387, at 17. Daiei Inc. sells more than 4500 products that are either
Daiei house brands or direct imports. Id. Daiei's house brand sales account for 13.1
percent of the store's total sales. Id.
456. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
457. Id.
458. Id. Although manufacturers are often ultimately liable for a product defect
claim, the reality is that customers usually go back to the store where they bought a
defective product to make a claim. Change Business Relationships, supra note 387, at 17.
459. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
460. Insurers Enjoy Boom, supra note 439, at 9; Product Liability Litigation Increase,
supra note 116, at 17.
461. Liability Law Spurs Consulting Services, DAiLv YOMIUmI, Sept. 1, 1995.
462. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
463. Hsu, supra note 2, at 135. The Fair Trade Commission is "[a] government
commission under the prime minister's office established to implement the Antimono-
poly Law of 1947." Id.
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the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.46 4 The issue of apportioning
liability between retailers and manufacturers is complicated465
and, before the enactment of the PL Law, retailers did not utilize
contracts to allocate product risks.4 66
As a result of the PL Law, some Japanese retailers are also
using contracts for the first time to structure relationships with
their customers.467 For example, ski shops are requiring custom-
ers to sign waivers that relieve the ski shops of liability for any
injuries resulting from the customers' use of skis.46 8 If a cus-
tomer refuses to sign the waiver, many ski shops will not sell the
skis to the customer.4 6 9 In another example, owners of bungee
jumping sites are requiring bungee jumpers to sign contracts
that shield the owners from liability.4 70
2. Impact on Japanese Judiciary, Legislature, and Bureaucracy
Recent product liability case law471 evidences a more pro-
consumer attitude among Japan's judges, who have long been
criticized for protecting large manufacturers against individual
plaintiffs. 47 2 By bringing the debate on Japan's new discovery
464. Product Liability Law Should be viewed as a challenge, Not Threat, supra note 419,
at 6. The Japanese government introduced the Antimonopoly Law in 1947 to decen-
tralize the postwar economy. Hsu, supra note 2, at 12. The Antimonoply Law bans
trusts, cartels, private monopolization, and unreasonable restraints of trade and unfair
competition. Id. Although critics argue the government has not strictly applied the law
because of its desire to preserve its relationship with the business community, recent
years show an increase in government enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law. Id.
465. Change Business Relationships, supra note 387, at 17. When determining who
should be responsible for compensation arising from a product defect claim, the analy-
sis turns on who was in charge of designing the product and at what stage of production
the defect was caused. Id.
466. Id.
467. Suki Kau no ni Do Isho - Jiko o Menseki' Cyokai ga PL Ho Taisaku [Even When




470. BunjeeJumpu: Setsubi no Shiyo wa iko Sekinin' [Bungee Jumping: 'At Your Own
Risk], NIHON KEIZA! SHIMBUN, Aug. 8, 1996.
471. Taishi Kensetsu Kogyo K.K. v. Matsushita Denki Sangyo K.K., 842 HANTA 69
(Osaka Dist. Ct., Mar. 29, 1994).
472. Nakamura Interview, supra note 114 (claiming new attitude of judges is one
of greatest changes resulting from PL Law); Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90 (claim-
ing before PL Law plaintiff attorneys' biggest hurdle was helping judges see cases from
plaintiffs' perspectives).
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law to center stage,473 the PL Law is also being credited for im-
pacting the Japanese legislature's initiative to reform the Civil
Code.4 7 4 Commentators additionally credit the PL Law for en-
couraging Japan's bureaucracy to upgrade the governmental
471ADR system for resolving product defect claims.
a. Recent PL Case Law: A New Bias Toward Consumers
Scholars claim a change in the attitude of the Japanese judi-
ciary is recognizable in the 1994 decision of Taishi Kensetsu Kogyo
K.K. v. Matsushita Denki Sangyo K.K 4 76 Commentators hold that
this case, although settled before the PL Law became effective,
was decided in anticipation of the coming of the PL Law.47 7 The
Matsushita Denki decision is in fact being hailed as the trend-set-
ting case under the new product liability regime.478
In Matsushita Denki, Taishi Construction claimed a defective
Matsushita Electric television caused a fire which completely de-
stroyed its office.4 79 Although the plaintiff was unable to clearly
prove causation, the Osaka District Court surprised the con-
sumer electronics industry by finding the television defective
and assuming the manufacture's negligence.48 ° The court less-
ened the plaintiffs burden by deciding that proof of defect was
enough to assume negligence.481  This case marked a sharp
break from the past because, for the first time in Japan, a court
473. Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90 (discussing how PL Law illuminated infor-
mation disclosure problems associated with Japan's legal system).
474. Id.
475. Yamashita Interview, supra note 359.
476. 842 HANTA 69 (Osaka Dist. Ct., March 29, 1994); Nakamura Interview, supra
note 114.
477. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 18, at 682 (claiming Osaka District Court
applied doctrine similar to res ipsa loquitor in anticipation of adoption of strict liability
in PL Law); Noriko Sato, Product Liability Law to Debut in Japan, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEW.
swiRE, June 28, 1995 (stating Japanese government's move toward enacting PL Law had
effect on court in Matsushita Electric); Matsushita Told by Court to Pay Fire Damages, Ra-
PORT FROM JAPAN, Mar. 30, 1994 (describing how Matsushita Electric drew great attention
because it came before enactment of PL Law).
478. Nakamura Interview, supra note 114; Matsushita Won't Appeal, supra note 334
(claiming Matsushita Electric was Japan's "first ruling that acknowledged a manufac-
turer's liability for its products."). Skeptics wonder whether the PL Law will lead to
more such victories for consumers. Id.
479. 84 HANTA 69 (Osaka Dist. Ct., March 29, 1994).
480. Sato, supra note 17.
481. Id. (mentioning that if court had not lifted plaintiffs burden, it would have
been difficult for plaintiff to prove negligence under Civil Code in this case).
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held an electronic manufacturer liable for producing a defective
product.4 82 The court justified its decision on the basis of show-
ing manufacturers the importance of ensuring safety.4 8 3 Matsu-
shita decided not to appeal the case because of Japan's growing
public interest in consumer protection.484 Matsushita has re-
vamped its product safety system in response to the court's deci-
4815sion.
Another landmark product liability case decided shortly
before the PL law's enactment shows the judiciary's new attitude
toward the importance of disclosure of information.486 In this
case, a Japanese citizen filed a lawsuit against the Tokyo Metro-
politan government for its failure to disclose information about
a high-density chemical detected in a type of health tea.4 87 The
Tokyo government resisted the plaintiff's plea for disclosure of
the brand name of the tea and the amount of chemical de-
tected.4 88
The plaintiff brought suit against the Tokyo government for
its violation of a Tokyo freedom of information ordinance that
requires the government to disclose to the public information
where disclosure is necessary to protect citizens' health.489 The
government attempted to avoid disclosure here by relying on a
clause in the ordinance that allows the Tokyo government to
withhold information in cases where disclosure would negatively
impact the competitiveness and profits of the manufacturer.49 °
The Tokyo District Court ruled against the Tokyo government
by holding the government can only refuse disclosure when it is
attempting to avoid specific and obvious damage to the manu-
482. Matsushita Won't Appeal, supra note 334.
483. Id. PresidingJudge Takeshi Mizuno stated "[Manufacturers] have a responsi-
bility to guarantee safety of their products. If there is a defect in the product, an acci-
dent is possible." Id.
484. Id.
485. Sato, supra note 17 (stating "Matsushita Electric is taking measures to 'double
check and triple check' the safety of its products .... Ten working groups have been set
up in the company to undertake everything from reviewing product design to making
educational video tapes for consumers.").
486. Court Demands Disclosure of Brand Name in Toxic-Tea Case, MAINICHI DAILY NEws,
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facturer.4 9 1 Observers claim the ruling is significant for its prior-
ity on consumers' health rather than on manufacturers' profit
and they believe the case will have a positive effect on the future
application of the PL Law.
4 9 2
Although no court has rendered a judgment under the PL
Law, the case that made headlines as the first case to be brought
under the PL Law is one in which a restaurant owner sued a
container maker and Dai Nippon Printing Co., a major printing
company.4 93 The plaintiff, who injured his thumb while trying to
open a tea container, claimed the carton's structure had a de-
sign defect. 494 The court has not yet reached its verdict, but the
defendants, after denying liability, quickly changed the design of
the carton.495
Another famous case brought after the PL Law's enactment
is one in which a plaintiff sued a Tokyo condom maker for al-
leged mental distress he suffered as a result of using a defective
condom.496 The plaintiff found a hole in the condom he used
while engaging in sexual intercourse with a prostitute in Thai-
land and said he suffered from fear of contracting the AIDS vi-
rus.497 The court dismissed this case, but observers hail this case,
as well as the tea carton case, as new kinds of cases in which
isolated plaintiffs feel empowered to use the legal system to
bring suits against large manufacturers.49 8
b. PL Law Spurs Enactment of New Discovery Law and
Debates on Freedom of Information Act
The 1975 Draft included provisions for compulsory discov-
491. Court Demands Disclosure, supra note 486, at 12. In his ruling of this case, Pre-
sidingJudge Hisao Sato said, "If information on the quality of products is made public,
it will enable consumers to compare different products. Manufacturers must accept
freedom of information, even if a disclosure adversely affects profits and competitive-
ness." Id.
492. Id.
493. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 4.
494. Shiteki no Kekkan o Saibanchu ni Kairyo, AsAmI SHIMBUN, July 13, 1996.
495. Id. The companies denied liability by claiming that they use a soft plastic
metal and that they had received no other report of injury after shipping 50 million
units of the container. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Quaranta Interview, supra note 347; Nakamura Interview, supra note 114.
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ery in product liability cases.499 Proponents of the 1975 Draft
argued thatJapan's deficient discovery system was the major bar-
rier plaintiffs faced during litigation and strict liability would
only assist plaintiffs if they had increased access to defendants'
information.500 Because drafters of the PL Law did not include
special discovery rules, attorney groups and political leaders
clamored for an amendment to the discovery rule in the Civil
Procedure Law of Japan.5 '
The former discovery rule, Article 312, provided only three
cases where a holder of a document was required to produce the
document for the adverse party.502 In all other situations, docu-
ment holders were able to refuse production.50 3 The new
amendment adds a general phrase, which is subject to two ex-
ceptions, that requires production of all other documents that
do not meet the requirements of the three original provisions of
Article 312.504 The two exceptions are for those documents that
are deemed confidential and documents that are created for the
exclusive use of the document holder.50 5 Observers argue that
the second exception is against the spirit of the discovery amend-
ment because, if interpreted broadly, the exception could allow
any internal corporate documents to be excluded from produc-
tion.5 0 6 Scholars do hope, however, that courts will not interpret
the provisions broadly because the basic premise of the amend-
ment is that all documents are available for discovery except for
the specific exceptions. 0 7 This premise, observers argue, is the
499. Marcuse, supra note 18, at 379-80 (describing how many people viewed com-
pulsory discovery scheme as radical but necessary).
500. Id.
501. Shichi Interview, supra note 114; Yamashita Interview, supra note 359 (discuss-
ing that debate on passing of PL Law exposed problems with Japan's discovery law).
502. Minsoho, art. 312. Article 312 provides that:
A holder shall not refuse the production thereof in the following cases: (1) In
[the] case the party himself is in possession of the document to which it has
referred to in litigation; (2) In [the] case the person going to prove is entitled
to require the holder of the document the delivery thereof or to demand its
perusal thereof; (3) In [the] case the document has been drawn for the bene-
fit of the person going to prove or drawn for the legal relations between him
and the holder thereof.
Id.
503. Product Liability Litigation Increase, supra note 116, at 17.
504. Minsoho, art. 220.
505. Id.
506. Taniguchi Interview, supra note 87.
507. Id.
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reason for the amendment because under the old law the pre-
sumption was against production unless the documents met spe-
cific requirements.5"8
The discovery law only applies to disclosure of non-govern-
ment documents. 509 As part of the amendment, however, the
Diet is required to enact a national freedom of information act
that would govern disclosure of government documents. 510 Cur-
rently, debate surrounds the enactment of this legislation on the
issue of whether the court or the government agency in posses-
sion of a document should have the authority to determine
whether the government document should be produced.511
c. Government ADR Upgraded and Law Promoted
In response to the enactment of the PL Law, the Japanese
bureaucracy upgraded its offering of product liability services.512
The government made efforts to respond to a predicted rise in
out of court settlements by assisting local governments with es-
tablishing consumer centers and complaint settlement agencies
that would mediate between consumers and manufacturers.513
These local government agencies are equipped to handle all
types of products and can service consumers who are unable to
visit industry-specific centers which are located mostly in To-
kyo.514 The Economic Planning Agency515 ("EPA") has drafted
mediation guidelines for the local agencies to follow and has
trained national government mediators to travel to local sites
when necessary. 51 6
In addition to upgrading product liability centers, the na-
tional government has spent much time and effort introducing
the PL Law to Japan.51 7 Seminars to publicize the PL Law have
508. Id.; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 87.
509. Minsoho, art. 220.
510. Id.
511. Taniguchi Interview, supra note 87; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90.
512. Stamping Out Appliance Fires, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Dec. 6, 1995; Sato, supra
note 17.
513. Stamping Out Appliance Fires, supra note 512.
514. Id.
515. Hsu, supra note 2, at 112. The EPA is "[a] [G]overnment agency under the
prime minister's office responsible for drafting the national economic plan and for
monitoring, analyzing, and forecasting economic trends."
516. Id.
517. Sato, supra note 17.
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been held in over 300 places nationwide, and pamphlets and
books have been sent to schools,518 companies, and local govern-
ments. The government has also aired informational commer-
cials about the PL Law on national television and radio.5 19
3. Impact on Consumer Consciousness and Consumer
Assertiveness
Through public and private efforts, Japanese consumers
have been flooded with information about the PL Law. 20 Wide-
spread education on product safety is triggering unprecedented
interest in consumer rights.521 Consumers have bought more
books describing the new PL Law than any other type of law
book in Japan's history.5 2 2 Moreover, according to a recent To-
kyo survey, seventy percent of Tokyo respondents claimed to
know the contents of the PL Law. 23
Observers claim that due to the increase in consumer con-
sciousness regarding product liability, Japanese consumers have
become more assertive and inquisitive about their rights. 524 For
example, the number of consumer complaints about product
troubles more than doubled after the PL Law went into effect. 525
Consumers, moreover, have greatly increased their consultations
with attorneys and mediators regarding potential product liabil-
ity suits since the PL Law's enactment.5 26 Additionally, consum-
ers have increased their product liability lawsuits under negli-
518. Ishida Interview, supra note 326 (explaining thatJapanese public school cur-
riculum now includes consumer education for first time and new consumer education
video being used in schools across Japan highlights PL Law).
519. Sato, supra note 17.
520. Ishida Interview, supra note 326.
521. Id.
522. See Liability Law Spawns Consulting Services, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Sept. 1, 1995, at
5 (discussing that appearance of several product liability law books on booksellers' best-
selling lists was unprecedented for law-related books in Japan).
523. Product Law Means, supra note 333, at 1. A survey of consumers released in
March 1995 by the Management and Coordination Agency found that 65.1% of the
respondents were unaware of the PL Law. Id. In a February 1996 survey conducted by
the Tokyo Metropolitan government, however, 70% of respondents claimed to know
the contents of the law. Id.
524. Nakamura Interview, supra note 114; Sugiyama Interview, supra note 90.
525. Product Complaints Double After Liability Law Start, supra note 336. The number
of complaints submitted to local governments more than doubled between July and
December 1995 compared with the same time period the previous year. Id.
526. Nakamura Interview, supra note 114.
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gence theory since the Diet enacted the PL Law. 2 7 Observers
claim that the increase in negligence lawsuits reflects the fact
that the PL Law only applies to products delivered to consumers
after July 1, 1995.528
III. THE CRITICS ARE WRONG: THE PL LAW IS A
NECESSARY AMD EPOCH-MAKING CHANGE
FOR JAPAN
Critics either claim that Japan did not need the PL Law or
that the PL Law is incapable of creating substantial change in
Japanese society.5 29 The critics largely come to their conclusions
by relying on out-dated generalizations about the workings ofJa-
pan's legal system and society. Shortsightedly, many of the crit-
ics fail to incorporate into their analyses the recognition that ma-
jor changes are sweeping through Japan today.
A. Japan Needed The PL Law to Empower Individual Plaintiffs in
Product Defect Cases and to Deregulate Product
Safety Regulations
A common argument given for why Japan did not need
strict liability is that Japan's consumers were adequately pro-
tected by government regulations.5"' This argument fails to con-
sider that excessive government regulation and intervention im-
peded Japan's economic growth in the global market by prevent-
ing free-market principles from taking root.531  Another
argument claims manufacturers voluntarily subjected themselves
to public insurance programs, such as the SG System,53 2 thus
eliminating the need for a mandatory strict liability system.533
The shortcoming of this argument is that only certain products
are covered by public programs and the weakening of adminis-
527. Manufacturers Assume Tort Responsibility, supra note 376, at 10.
528. Nakamura Inteview, supra note 114.
529. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (presenting varying criticisms of
PL Law's need and effectiveness)
530. See supra notes 280-82 accompanying text (discussing view of government
leaders who opposed enactment of PL Law that regulation protected consumers).
531. See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text (discussing method of govern-
ment regulation and its impact on free market for consumers).
532. See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text (discussing workings of SG Sys-
tem).
533. See supra notes 278-87 and accompanying text (discussing view of critics who
dismissed need of PL Law).
1997]
180 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:108
trative guidance may greatly reduce manufacturers' voluntary
compliance with such programs. 4 A third argument claims
that because judges waived the negligence burden for some
plaintiffs, judges did not need the PL Law to apply strict liability
theory. The problem with this argument is that only plaintiffs
involved in mass disasters received preferential judicial treat-
ment.5 35 Single-injury plaintiffs, meanwhile, were often left with-
out recovery options in court or through ADR because of their
lack of bargaining power.
1. The Negligence System Existed as an Inadequate Legal
Regime for Single-Injury Product Liability Plaintiffs
Because of the difficulty in proving privity of contract in
most cases, plaintiffs brought their claims under negligence the-
ory.5 36 Japan's negligence law did not make any specific al-
lowances for product defect cases and, thus, with limited discov-
ery practices, plaintiffs rarely had enough evidence to prove
their cases. Moreover, unable to view internal corporate doc-
uments, 538 most plaintiffs were unable to prove a manufacturer's
foreseeability of harm and availability of alternative designs.539
In light of inadequate law,judges sometimes used discretion
in employing their own versions of negligence and waiving plain-
tiffs' burden of proof for elements such as causation and foresee-
ability.54 ° Because Japan is a Civil Code country, however, judges
are not legally empowered to take such expansive views of the
law. As a result, judges had to be selective in which cases they
534. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of
government regulation).
535. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text (discussing how negligence sys-
tem worked only where judges distorted application of law in mass disaster cases).
536. See supra notes 191-99 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's negligence
law).
537. See supra notes 191-214 and accompanying text (discussing negligence law
and famous product liability cases brought under negligence theory).
538. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (discussing limits of Japan's
former discovery law).
539. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty plaintiffs had
in HIV litigation proving elements of manufacturer foreseeability and avoidability in
making successful negligence claim).
540. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (showing example cases where
judge modified application of negligence law).
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applied an abstract form of negligence.541 Unfortunately for sin-
gle-injury plaintiffs, Japan's judges tended to only waive burdens
of proof in cases involving widely-publicized mass disasters.542
Preclusion from the legal system forced single-injury prod-
uct liability plaintiffs to consider ADR options.543 Before the PL
Law, however, consumers faced manufacturers and retailers
without much bargaining power because few manufacturers be-
lieved there was any chance begrudged consumers would sue
and win. 5 44 Thus, although many of those who opposed the PL
Law said the law was unnecessary because Japanese consumers
preferred ADR and were satisfied handling their claims out-of-
court,5 14 in reality, the playing field was unleveled. Many con-
sumers were forced to forego their claims or settle for less than
they deserved.546
Critics who contend the PL Law was unnecessary for Japan
often point to the mass disaster cases as their proof that Japan
did have a working product liability system where plaintiffs could
sue and win. A product liability system, however, can not be
deemed to be working if judges must distort the law to allow for
plaintiffs' recovery.547 Moreover, the former system essentially
excluded recovery for injuries which occurred outside of the
mass disaster cases.548 Japanese society clearly needed the PL
Law to bring greater justice to the average product liability plain-
tiff whose television, for example, may explode, in an isolated
incident, and cause a fire.
541. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs in famous
mass tort suits were successful because of judicial discretion).
542. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (explaining how single-injury
plaintiffs did not receive same treatment as plaintiffs in mass disaster cases),
543. See supra notes 126-56 and accompanying text (explaining ADR options avail-
able to plaintiffs prior to PL Law's enactment).
544. See supra notes 383-86 and accompanying text (illustrating boost PL Law gave
to consumer bargaining power).
545. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing whether Japanese
really prefer ADR methods over litigation or whether system gives them no other choice
but to pursue claims through ADR).
546. See supra note 390 and accompanying text (describing imbalance in bargain-
ing power between consumers and manufacturers before PL Law).
547. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (discussing how judges dis-
torted tort law to benefit certain plaintiffs).
548. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (describing inability of single-
injury plaintiffs to recover under negligence system).
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2. Government-Initiated Product Safety System Harmed
Japan's Economy by Erecting Non-Tariff Trade
Barriers and Restricting Product Choice
Because of a dearth of product liability litigation under the
negligence system, 549 Japan's judiciary offered little incentive for
manufacturers to take consumer claims seriously and spend cor-
porate assets on promoting safer products. In place of judicial
incentives, Japan's government assumed the role of regulating
product safety. 550 The government's regulation focused on en-
forcing uniform product standards and certification and inspec-
tion systems. 551 The government's regulation, however, contrib-
uted to Japan's economic and trade problems552 by creating
non-tariff barriers to imported goods, limiting domestic manu-
facturers' diversity in creating products, and forcing consumers
to pay for expensive inspection and certification systems.553
Japan needed the PL Law to loosen government regulation
and allow the Japanese market to behave more like a free-market
economy. Manufacturers needed to be able to conduct their
own cost-benefit analyses to determine whether a product's ben-
efits outweighed its risks instead of being prevented by the gov-
ernment to sell certain products because the products' designs
did not meet the government's uniformity standards. The gov-
ernment's regulatory system was economically inefficient be-
cause the market was not determining the suitability of prod-
ucts. 554 Often, the government's standards existed without a ra-
tional basis for product safety. 555
Now, with consumers better able to fend for themselves
under the protections of the PL Law, the government is loosen-
549. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing small number of product
liability cases brought in Japan over the last fifty years).
550. See supra notes 210-32 and accompanying text (describing role of government
in regulating Japan's product safety).
551. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text (describing how Japanese gov-
ernment regulates product safety).
552. See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text (describing how governmen-
tal regulation impacted Japan's trade problems).
553. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text (discussing how governmental
regulation of product safety negatively impacts Japanese society).
554. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing how uniformity
standards guide Japanese regulation of product safety).
555. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (showing example of product regu-
lation unrelated to safety issues).
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ing its top-down approach to product safety and reducing its bar-
riers to imported goods. This will improve Japan's commitment
to global convergence 556 and enable the government to show the
world that it is serious about deregulating and making Japan be-
have more like other free-market economies.
557
3. Unraveling ofthe Iron Triangle and Consumer Demands
for Less Expensive Products Decreases Manufacturer
Incentives to Produce Safe Products
Japan's changing political and economic landscape 551 is re-
ducing manufacturer incentives to produce safe products. 559 As
Japanese manufacturers increasingly move abroad to avoid the
workings of the Iron Triangle, the government's influence on
industry and its ability to exert administrative guidance will con-
tinue to wane.56° Manufacturers, who once felt compelled to
comply with government standards to receive business favors,
will be more willing to act independently. 56t Thus, the govern-
ment will have less ability to enforce public insurance pro-
grams, 562 compensation trust funds,563 and safety regulations.
564
Moreover, Japanese consumers, considered by some observ-
ers to be the other incentive-creating factor in Japan's product
565
safety equation, are becoming less willing to pay high costs for
556. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text (discussing trend of global con-
vergence).
557. See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text (explaining Japan's desire to
reduce non-tariff trade barriers and enhance its international image as a free market
economy).
558. See supra notes 306-11 and accompanying text (describing the unraveling of
Japan's interlocking system of politicians, bureaucracy, and business).
559. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text (discussing how manufacturers
will be less willing to follow governmental orders).
560. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (explaining how Japanese compa-
nies are moving facilities abroad to avoid the regulation of Japanese market).
561. See supra notes 309-11 (discussing new independence among Japanese manu-
facturers).
562. See supra notes 233-47 and accompanying text (discussing workings ofJapan's
public insurance programs).
563. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text (explaining functioning of Ja-
pan's compensation trust funds).
564. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text (explaining government regu-
lations).
565. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (explaining how high demands of
Japanese consumers encouraged manufacturers to enact very efficient quality control
programs).
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products.5 66 In an effort to reduce costs, manufacturers may
have less incentive to continue their 100% inspection policies.
Manufacturers may also have less ability to ensure high quality in
their production facilities abroad. This is where a stronger judi-
ciary, bolstered by the enactment of the PL Law, is necessary to
provide incentives to manufacturers to pay attention to consum-
ers.
B. PL Law Has Changed Japan by Increasing the Power of
Consumers vis-d-vis Manufacturers and the Government
Because plaintiffs have brought few cases under the PL Law,
critics have been quick to suggest thatJapanese non-litigiousness
will prevent the PL Law from creating substantial impact. These
critics, however, fail to realize that since the PL Law's enactment,
consumers have greatly increased their claims against manufac-
turers and have received much more equitable settlements from
manufacturers.567 The judiciary, moreover, has gained a greater
role in creating incentives for manufacturers to produce safer
products. By bringing education on consumer rights to the fore-
front, the PL Law has also reduced cultural tendencies of Japa-
nese consumers to be averse to promoting their rights. More-
over, structural barriers are showing signs of reduction in the
wake of the PL Law.
1. PL Law Leveled Playing Field Between Manufacturers
and Consumers
Critics argue the PL Law is too ambiguous to lead to much
positive legal change for consumers. They argue that the law
should have contained a clearer definition of defect, should not
have provided for manufacturer defenses, and should have in-
cluded a provision for presumed defects in certain cases. 568 The
law's legal ambiguity, however, does not mean it will be used
against consumers. In fact, ambiguity leaves interpretation in
the hands of the judiciary in determining whether the law will be
pro-consumer or not.
566. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (describing new tendency
among Japanese consumers to be bargain shoppers).
567. See supra notes 388-402 and accompanying text (discussing favorable settle-
ments consumers are being offered as result of PL Law).
568. A Lukewarm PL Bill, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Apr. 14, 1994, at 1.
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The recent Matsushita Denki569 decision, moreover, indicates
that the PL Law is actually influencing Japan's judges to favor
consumers.5 7' The burden of proof for plaintiffs now begins
with an assumption of fault on behalf of the manufacturer.571
This change is in direct contrast to the prevailing presumption
among judges prior to the PL Law that product defects were
mostly attributable to consumer misuse.
The PL Law has also leveled the playing field between man-
ufacturers and consumers by ushering in a plethora of new con-
sumer-oriented alternative dispute facilities. The government
has implemented new product liability services at its consumer
centers across the country5 7 2 and major industries have estab-
lished product liability centers.5 73 These centers provide con-
sumers with viable options to pursue claims against manufactur-
ers.574 Moreover, many companies have initiated sophisticated
programs to facilitate claim handling.575 Manufacturers have
also revamped their warnings and instructions to give Japanese
consumers the same treatment they once only gave consumers in
their export markets.5 76 The PL Law has clearly expanded in-
jured plaintiffs' opportunities to have their claims taken seri-
ously. If this trend continues, the law will undeniably exist for
the benefit of consumers.
2. PL Law Strengthens Role of Judiciary in Japan's Product
Liability System
The PL Law has engendered a fear among manufacturers
569. See supra note 471 and accompanying text (discussing Matsushita Denki deci-
sion).
570. See supra notes 471-85 and accompanying text (discussing Matsushita Electric
decision and its impact on Japan's judges).
571. See supra note 355 and accompanying text (describing under strict liability
theory plaintiffs no longer have burden to prove fault on behalf of manufacturer).
572. See supra notes 512-16 and accompanying text (describing how Japanese gov-
ernment has implemented new product liability services at existing consumer centers
throughout Japan).
573. See supra notes 403-14 and accompanying text (explaining how major Japa-
nese manufacturers and entire industries have established product liability centers).
574. See supra notes 406-11 and accompanying text (describing claim-handling
processes at product liability centers).
575. See supra notes 382, 404 and accompanying text (describing how individual
manufacturers are establishing new processes for handling product liability claims).
576. See supra notes 415-25 and accompanying text (discussing manufacturers' ini-
tiatives to upgrade warnings and instructions on products).
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that consumers can actually sue them for product liability claims
and win.5 77 Thus, judicial incentives are finally at work in Japan.
Manufacturers are now much more willing to apply strict liability
theory and settle claims with consumers to avoid the potential of
having their reputation ruined through litigation.57 Manufac-
turers are also greatly increasing their purchase of product liabil-
ity insurance which is leading to higher settlement awards for
consumers.
5 79
Although the greatest evidence of a stronger judicial role is
being seen through increased manufacturer incentives to apply
the PL Law in their settlements with consumers, the PL Law has
also encouraged more consumers to utilize the courts to pursue
their claims. 58 0 Although only a few cases have been brought
under the PL Law since the PL Law's enactment, the number of
product liability cases brought under negligence law has in-
creased.581 Critics often overlook that only those products deliv-
ered to consumers after July 1, 1995 are protected by the PL
Law. The rise in negligence product liability cases evidences a
new attitude among consumers that even under the original
legal theories, their chances of winning in court are greater be-
cause of the influence of the PL Law. This trend indicates the
potential for profound change in Japan's litigation environment
once more products actually covered by strict liability become
defective.
3. PL Law Reduces Cultural and Structural Barriers
to Litigation
The PL Law has disproved the Cultural Theorists' view that
Japanese are innately averse to exercising their individual
rights.582 In fact, in the wake of the PL Law's enactment, Japa-
577. See supra notes 391, 397 and accompanying text (describing new attitude of
manufacturers toward consumers in light of manufacturers' belief that consumers can
now bring successful product liability claims in court).
578. See supra notes 388-402 and accompanying text (discussing greater willingness
among manufacturers to settle claims with consumers).
579. See supra notes 439-41 and accompanying text (explaining increase in product
liability insurance sales).
580. See supra notes 493-98 and accompanying text (describing trend among con-
sumers to pursue product liability litigation).
581. See supra notes 527-28 and accompanying text (discussing increase in negli-
gence-based product liability lawsuits after PL Law was enacted).
582. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing that some scholars argue
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nese consumers are now more willing to voice their complaints.
Product liability claims at consumer centers have doubled since
the PL Law began,583 law suits have risen,584 and attorney consul-
tations have increased. 85 Recent widespread education about
the PL Law and consumer rights in general appears to be en-
couraging Japanese to protect their interests and question au-
thority when necessary.586
The PL Law has also shed doubt on the belief held by Cul-
tural Theorists that the Japanese are opposed to structuring rela-
tionships through the use of contracts. 87 Since the PL Law's
enactment, consumers and merchants are facing contracts more
frequently in their daily lives. Skiers and bungee-jumpers, for
example, are now asked to sign contracts before engaging in the
sports.588 Manufacturers are facing unprecedented pressure
from retailers to negotiate allocation of product liability risks in
contracts. 5 89 The PL Law, in conjunction with other societal
changes in Japan, appears to be increasing the role of law in the
lives of more Japanese. In time, more and more Japanese are
apt to prove Cultural Theorists wrong590 by showing that Japa-
nese attitudes toward law do change with time and that Japanese
consumers can actually believe the law exists to protect their in-
dividual rights.59
The PL Law has also led to a reduction in structural barri-
Japanese believe protecting individual interests is a shameful thing and using law to
further one's own rights is detestable).
583. See supra note 525 and accompanying text (illustrating rise in consumer
claims once law took effect).
584. See supra notes 476-98, 527-28 and accompanying text (discussing increase in
lawsuits).
585. See supra note 526 and accompanying text (noting that consumers are increas-
ing attorney consultations about product liability questions).
586. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (describing Cultural Theorists'
view that Japanese are unwilling to assert claims and protect their individual rights).
587. See supra notes 451-52 and accompanying text (describing traditional view
that Japanese shun use of contracts in business and non-business relationships).
588. See supra notes 467-70 and accompanying text (describing increase in use of
contracts between retailers and customers).
589. See supra notes 453-66 and accompanying text (describing confrontational sit-
uation between retailers and manufacturers in attempting to allocate product liability
risks).
590. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing view among some
scholars that Japanese citizens do not view role of law as Westerners do).
591. See supra notes 63, 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing Structural Theo-
rists view that Japanese are not simply non-litigious because of an innate cultural ten-
dency and that Japanese attitudes toward law change with time).
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ers. Debate on the PL Law has illuminated the weaknesses of the
Japanese legal system to the public at large. The importance of
transparency in disseminating information has become a topic
of great scrutiny. The new discovery law comes into effect Janu-
ary 1, 1998 and a national freedom of information act is on its
way.592 The number of attorneys in Japan is also increasing.
Within a few years, 1,000 attorneys are expected to be admitted
per year.593 Attorneys will be more available and willing to repre-
sent product liability plaintiffs now that judges can easily rule in
plaintiffs' favor without having to distort the law.5 9 4 The PL Law
has also led to an increase in ADR processes. Although at first
glance the new ADR services may seem to be a barrier to the PL
Law's effectiveness, recent settlements show that the theories of
the PL Law are being followed in ADR negotiations.
CONCLUSION
This Note, while discussing the positive effects of the PL
Law, in no way suggestsJapan's product safety system is now ade-
quate. On the contrary, much more needs to be accomplished.
The courts must become more accessible for plaintiffs and the
new discovery rule must not just exist as a law on the books but
must be a changing force in the way litigation is carried out in
Japan. The ability for plaintiffs to access information will deter-
mine the future of the PL Law. If consumers are not given rea-
son to maintain what seems to be a new confidence in the judi-
cial system, manufacturers will no longer fear litigation and all
gains made in increasing the role of the judiciary will be lost.
Judges must also continue to be fair to plaintiffs.
Because the PL Law enters Japanese society amidst great so-
cial, political, and economic change, many of the cultural and
institutional barriers of the past are sure to be continually re-
duced. Critics who analyze the PL Law's potential from the per-
spective of a static Japanese society are missing the true picture.
Deregulation and consumer empowerment are becoming revo-
592. See supra notes 499-511 and accompanying text (discussing new amendment
to Japan's discovery law); Shichi Interview (noting that new discovery law has potential
to greatly affect future litigation in Japan).
593. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining increase in number of
attorneys being admitted to Japanese bar).
594. See supra notes 90, 472 and accompanying text (discussing thatJapanese attor-
neys were reluctant to take plaintiffs' product liability cases before PL Law)
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lutionizing forces for the future of Japan, and the PL Law is play-
ing a role in shaping these forces. While it is difficult to predict
future impact, it is clear that in the short time since the law's
enactment, great change is underway. In the words of econo-
mist Adam Smith, ". . . producers and consumers must stand on
an equal footing if a market economy is to be preserved."595 Due
to the PL Law, Japanese consumers are now standing on a more
equal footing.
595. A Lukewarm PL Bill, supra note 568, at 1.
1997]
